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INTRODUCTION 
As tort liability has greatly expanded over the past forty years, • the 
1 By expansion of tort liability, I mean, expansion of the scope of tort liability, that is, 
enlargement of the range of acts that can give rise to tort liability. This process has taken place 
throughout the twentieth century but it accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s, and quickened in the 
1980s. Indeed, thousands of tort claims brought in the 1980s and thereafter, have resulted in 
defendants' retroactive inculpation for acts occurring in the 1940s and 1950s which were 
nontortious at the time. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency Fee 
Lawyers: Competing Data And Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. at n.l (forthcoming 
November 2003) [hereinafter Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates\, see also Lester Brickman, On 
the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes are Principally 
Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755 (1994) [hereinafter 
Brickman, Tort System Outcomes]-, Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market 
In Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 Wisc. L. REV. 859, 874, 875 n.56 (2002) [hereinafter Scales, 
Market For Tort Claims] (referring to the "profound expansion in tort liability that has occurred 
during the past few decades" and conjuring up a Rip Van Winkle spouse who time-travels from 
the 1950s to the present and is "amazed to learn that she had acquired obligations to protect 
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consequent wealth transferred has increased exponentially.^ The 
impetus for this expansion is multi-faceted and complex.^ In part, the 
expansion has been a function of changes in substantive tort law 
favoring liability,'^ the contraction of defenses to tort liability,^ and 
changes in procedural rules giving plaintiffs' lawyers broad pretrial 
discovery powers.® The effects of these changes have been magnified 
by enormously increased asset pools available to plaintiffs seeking 
compensation for tortious behavior"' as well as by the vastly increased 
criminal trespassers from harming themselves on her property, warn neighbors of the sexual 
predations of her spouse, or prevent people from misusing purchases so as to harm themselves")-
For further discussion of the expansion in the scope of liability of the tort system, popularly 
known as "the litigation explosion," see sources cited in Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths 
Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 739 n.l (2002) [hereinafter Kritzer, Seven 
Myths\ 
2 Although it is difficult to directly measure the amount of wealth transferred under the tort 
system, surrogates for the quantum of wealth transfer exist. One such surrogate is total tort 
system costs. In 1960, U.S. tort system costs totaled $32.3 billion (adjusted for inflation to year 
2001 dollars). In 2001, tort system costs reached $205.4 billion, an increase of 536% since 1960. 
See U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE app. I (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002). 
2 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DBPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001) 
(presenting a remarkable analysis of legal, political, financial, social and economic trends that 
have aggrandized the power of the plaintiffs' bar and subtended the increase in the scope of tort 
liability). 
" One of the most significant of the many changes in substantive law is the development of 
the doctrine of strict liability making manufacturers liable for a wide Variety of injury-producing 
products. This, in turn, has led to emergence of plaintiff friendly products liability litigation, 
which, however, would not have come about without the rise of mass production and distribution. 
See id. at 190-92. 
5 See id. (noting the disappearance of municipal and charitable immunity thus allowing 
ordinary negligence actions to be brought against, for example, a charitable hospital; and the 
replacement of the contributory negligence doctrine, which once provided an absolute defense, by 
comparative fault). 
6 See id. at 194-95. Yeazell argues that modem products liability law is largely derivative of 
changes in discovery rules. The 1938 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure armed 
plaintiffs' lawyers with broad pretrial discovery powers. Ironically, the costs of such discovery 
were initially daunting for plaintiffs' lawyers but after several decades, they "recapital[ized] 
themselves to the point where they could take cases deep enough into discovery to realize some 
of the potential gain from such pretrial preparation." Id. at 195. Yeazell then asserts that it was 
this procedural change that caused much of the substantive change: 
Had there not been a regime of pretrial discovery, it would not have been worth 
developing a law of products liability. Without pretrial access to engineering studies, 
intemal memoranda, and the like, decisions about appropriate safety levels in relation 
to known technology and cost would have been difficult to make. 
Id. 
7 Those increased asset pools include automobile insurance, the volume of which has grown 
dramatically due to credit enabled consumer purchases of automobiles and mandatory auto 
insurance requirements; home owner's insm-ance, which similarly has grown due to credit 
enabled access to housing (which is often government sponsored) and the pronounced trend 
toward home ownership; healthcare provider liability insurance; and increased govemment 
funded and employer funded health insurance, which, along with technological advances, leads to 
greater demand for medical services, which in tum give rise to higher rates of tort claiming. See 
id. at 187-90. Furthermore, since medical costs rise faster than inflation, medical suits have 
become comparatively more attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers, who are working for a 
share of the total damage bill. Put another way, insurance and health care research 
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financial strength of the plaintiffs' bar^ and the relative decrease in the 
financial strength of the defense bar.^ 
While the rate of inerease in wealth transfers declined in the past 
decade, more recently, tort system costs have resumed historic growth 
rates that prevailed in the 1960-88 period.In fact, projections of 
future growth indicate a doubling of tort costs over the next ten years. 
The enormity of the quantum of wealth transferred to date and the 
consequent costs imposed on the economy have spawned the tort reform 
wars'2 and can only be expected to have an increasing impact on the 
debate as the costs of the tort system mount. 
Virtually all tort claiming is financed by plaintiff lawyers through 
the medium of contingent fees. Since these fees are assessed against the 
quantum of wealth transferred, the enormous increases in the amounts 
of wealth transferred under the aegis of the tort system have redounded 
have made tort suits more attractive investments for plaintiffs. Making them more 
attractive for plaintiffs has made them a growth industry for the insurance industry and 
for the defense bar. Litigation has achieved a symbiotic relationship with the most 
significant aspects of the consumer credit market. 
Id. at 190. In asbestos litigation, comprehensive general liability policies issued to the 
manufacturers and installers of asbestos-containing products and their corporate successors were 
rewritten by judicial fiat to create tens of billions of dollars in insurance coverage. See Lester 
Brickman, On The Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between 
Scholarship And Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. at nn.57-58 (forthcoming December 2003) [hereinafter 
Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation], Because some insurers had issued policies that did 
not set aggregate policy limits, the asset pool thus created may approach or even exceed $50 
billion. See id. atn.59. See also lefftey O'Cormell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health 
Insurance: A Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1306-08 (1994) (demonstrating that 
expansion of social and private insurance inflates the cost of tort liability and concluding that the 
likely extension of health insurance to broader segments of the population may be expected to 
lead to increased wealth transfer under the tort system). 
^ See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 199-205 (noting that specialization has led to both increased 
retention of intellectual capital and to increased referrals and fee splitting, which in tum helps 
ensure that a given case will be well financed by making its way to the top of the secondary 
market in tort claims maintained by the plaintiffs' bar; and noting further that the plaintiffs' bar 
has gained access to increased lines of credit through traditional banking loans to firms and 
through firm loans directly to clients). See also Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Justice on Loan, 19 
CAL. LAW. 39, 40 (1999) (noting that plaintiffs' firms ability to carry lawsuits through lengthy 
discovery have been augmented by access to what has become routine bank loans, and that 
Citibank Private Bank in San Francisco "finances more than 400 firms and 25,000 attomeys 
nationwide"). 
' See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 197-98 (noting that insurers have closely scrutinized and 
constrained their defense litigation costs). 
10 See U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE 1 (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002) ("[T]he growth 
in tort costs experienced in 2001 is in stark contrast to the moderate rate of growth experienced in 
the past decade and is more akin to the double-digit growth rates experienced in the decades of 
the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s."). 
11 The projection for 2000-2005 is based on Tillinghast's estimate of an annual tort cost 
increase of 9 percent for that period. See id. Projections for the period 2006-2010 are based on a 
phone conversation with Ross Sutter at Tillinghast. Telephone Interview with Ross Sutter, 
Tillinghast (Nov. 5, 2002). 
12 For a discussion of the tort reform wars, see Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 
1, app. E. 
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to the financial benefit of plaintiff lawyers. Elsewhere, I have estimated 
that contingent fees in tort cases are generating upwards of twenty-two 
billion dollars in annual income and are increasing at a substantial 
rate.'^ The resultant increased financial capacity of the plaintiff s bar 
may thus be seen as simply reflecting the success of that bar in vastly 
enlarging the scope of tort liability. Viewed from this conventional 
approach, the dynamic relationship between the increases in tort 
liability and contingent fee incomes is apparent; increasing incomes 
have enabled lawyers to undertake financing of larger scale tort 
litigation, thus generating increased revenues which support larger 
investments in tort claiming. 
Few scholars who have addressed the issue of tort litigation have 
considered whether a major causative element of the expansion in tort 
liability is the substantially increasing yield from contingent fees 
realized by the plaintiffs bar. In part, this may be due to a failure to 
perceive how lucrative contingent fee claiming has become. Over the 
past forty years, the average effective hourly rate of the contingent fee 
bar has increased, in inflation-adjusted dollars, by 1000 to 1400%.''^ 
Moreover, a top tier consisting of approximately 25 to 30 percent of the 
torts bar is able to obtain effective rates of return of thousands of dollars 
an hour; when these fees are obtained in cases where the lawyer has 
undertaken no meaningful risk,i5 they are properly referred to as 
windfall fees.'® 
The enormous increases in the effective hourly rates of the 
contingent fee bar parallel the enormous expansion of tort liability. 
While it cannot be gainsaid that the huge profits being generated by 
contingent fee claiming strongly underpin the process of expansion of 
tort liability, which is the chicken and which the egg is a proposition of 
considerable importance to the issue of civil justice reform and, in 
particular, to tort reform. If the substantial increase in the profitability 
13 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, atn.117. Other commentators have 
calculated that contingent fees in tort cases are significantly higher than $22 billion, and in fact, 
total nearly $40 billion per year. See CENTER FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE MANHATTAN 
INSTITUTE, TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT ON THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003 2 
(2003). The Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute arrived at this total by 
"multiplying the 19 percent tort cost share of plaintiffs' attomeys times the $205.4 billion overall 
tort cost [which includes both self insured, i.e., uninsured, tort costs and insured tort costs]." Id. at 
n.4. This formula was based on a recent Tillinghast-Towers Perrin report on tort system costs, 
which estimated that plaintiffs' attomeys' fees account for approximately 19 percent of total tort 
costs. U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE 17 (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002). Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin defined insured tort costs to include "first party benefits (the cost of legal defense 
and claims handling), benefits paid to third parties (claimants and plaintiffs) or their attomeys, 
and an administrative, or overhead, component... [and] includes costs associated with all claims, 
not just those that reach the courthouse." Id. 
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. A. 
15 Id. at nn.l09, 152 and text accompanying n.l24. 
16 Id. atn.l3. 
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of contingent fee claiming is a primary factor accounting for the 
enormous expansion of tort liability and the consequent increases in 
wealth transferred, as I have argued,'^ then that has profound 
implications for our civil justice system and for the ongoing tort reform 
debate. 
For example, those who conclude, as a matter of their political 
calculus, that the quantum of wealth transfer is excessive, may wish to 
reconsider their current focus on reforming the tort system by changing 
tort doctrines and rules of civil procedure. Instead, they may be well 
advised to shift their focus to a consideration of how lawyers have been 
able to increase their profits from tort claiming by such a substantial 
margin. Indeed, if it is the profits that are a primary force driving the 
expansion of tort liability, then the means of financing most tort 
litigation in the United States requires a far more searching and 
systematic inquiry than has yet been undertaken, irrespective of where 
one stands on the issue of tort reform. Any such inquiry must 
necessarily focus on whether the increased profits reflect increases in 
opportunity costs or, alternatively, reflect returns above competitive 
rates, that is, rents'^—a product of a noncompetitive market. If the 
market for tort claiming services is determined not to be competitive, 
then the focus of the inquiry must shift to analyzing the factors 
accounting for the market failure, including identifying structural 
impediments to the operation of a competitive market and, as well, 
remediating actions that can be undertaken. Such an inquiry must also 
focus on whether self-correcting market mechanisms that might 
otherwise arise are unavailing because of coordinated efforts by lawyers 
to prevent competition. Such efforts might include collusive actions to 
maintain uniform pricing and the bar's use of its self-regulatory 
authority to insulate tort claiming from competitive forces that would 
otherwise reduce rents. If that inquiry further leads to the conclusion 
that competitive market conditions cannot arise absent regulatory 
intervention, then current tort reform efforts may be seen as 
substantially misdirected because they focus on symptoms rather than 
causes. In addition, regulatory agencies with authority to investigate 
and prosecute coordinated efforts by professionals to prevent price 
See generally Brickman, Tort System Outcomes, supra note 1. 
18 Rents or monopoly rents are the earnings yielded by restrictions on competition. See 
generally ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: 
COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 189, 293-94 (3d ed. 1983). See also DAVID BEGG, 
STANLEY FISCHER & RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, ECONOMICS 146-48 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
BEGG ET AL., ECONOMICS] (Monopoly rents, also called supernormal profits or monopoly profits, 
are the pure profits yielded as a result of the non-competitive nature of monopolies. Whereas the 
competitive firm maximizes profits at the equilibrium price determined by supply and demand, 
the monopolist is able to decrease quantity and increase price to a quantity that exceeds its output 
costs without the threat of losing business to competitors. Monopoly rents equal the residual 
earnings after deducting the monopoly's output costs from its increased revenue.). 
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competition would also find their interests implicated. 
In this article, I propose to undertake such an inquiry. To set the 
stage and provide an appropriate context, I set forth below a summary 
statement of positions I have previously advanced regarding the 
legitimacy, use and effect of contingency fee financed tort claiming. 
These propositions include: 
1) that contingent fees in personal injury cases are subject to 
regulatory regimes and that under both ethical codes and fiduciary law, 
fees are limited to "reasonable" amounts;'^ 
2) that because contingent fees are designed to compensate lawyers 
for risk and to therefore yield higher fee payments than hourly rate or 
fixed fees, the ethical validity of a contingent fee is a funetion of the 
existence of meaningful risk being assumed by the lawyer;^'' 
3) that sinee a substantial component of the standard eontingent fee 
is the premium a lawyer is charging for assuming risk and since 
existence of a realistic risk regarding compensation is mandated by 
ethieal codes and fiduciary principles, then it follows, a fortiori, that if 
risk is present, then the risk premium must be proportionate to the risk 
and the anticipated effort that will be put at risk;2i 
4) that contingent fee lawyers charging standard contingent fees 
are routinely overcharging some claimants because, in many instances, 
the representation involves no meaningful risk of no or low recovery 
and therefore the substantial risk premium in these instances yields 
unearned and unethical windfall fees;^^ 
5) that these windfall fees often amount to effective rates of 
thousands of dollars an hour;^^ 
6) that a hallmark of the gross overcharging that permeates 
contingency fee practice is the zero-based accounting system whereby 
lawyers speciously assign all tort claims a value of zero for purposes of 
applying their contingent fees to recoveries even though many claims 
have substantial value at the time the lawyer is retained;^'' 
7) that the gross overcharging of tort claimants is not only in the 
interest of plaintiff lawyers but also benefits defendant lawyers, and has 
received the imprimatur of the American Bar Association;^^ 
" Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of 
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29,44-74 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingent Fees], 
20 See id. at 70-84. 
2' 5ee/rf. at 94-99. 
22 See id. at 70-74; see also Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n. 13. 
23 Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 73-74, 92-93; see also Lester Brickman, ABA 
Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 280-83 
(1996) [hereinafter Brickman, Money Talks]. 
24 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note I, at n. 11. 
25 See Brickman, Money Talks, supra note 23, at lAl-Cl', Lester Brickman, The Continuing 
Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection : Ethics 2000's Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 
U. III. L. REV., text accompanying notes 128-48 (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Brickman, 
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8) that despite the routine violation of ethical rules purporting to 
limit risk premiums in contingent fee claiming to amounts 
commensurate with risk, lawyers are virtually never disciplined for 
violation of these rules;^^ 
9) that contrary to the claims of many tort lawyers, the actual risk 
level of most contingent fee lawyers' portfolios of cases does not justify 
the substantial risk premiums that they uniformly charge;^'' 
10) that a principal reason why the actual risk level is far less than 
that claimed is that contingent fee lawyers carefully screen their cases, 
and thus prevail in close to 90 percent of the cases they accept and, in 
addition, obtain reimbursement of close to 100% of all litigation 
expenses they advance, including expenses incurred in the cases where 
they do not prevail;^^ 
11) that contingent fee lawyers charge uniform prices—standard 
contingent fees—varying from thirty-three to 50 percent depending on 
the jurisdiction;^^ 
12) that charging standard contingent fees in cases of low risk or 
no meaningful risk is designed to and does yield windfall fees unearned 
by either risk or effort;^'' 
13) that empirical evidence to the effect that tort lawyers' effective 
hourly rates are substantially the same as those realized by their hourly 
rate counterparts is based upon trivial and misleading data and is 
therefore unreliable and inaccurate;^' 
14) that, nonetheless, this data is widely relied on by torts' scholars 
to prove the absence of rents, and is cited by opponents of tort reform as 
justification for their opposition;^^ 
15) that contrary to this data, effective hourly rates of contingent 
fee lawyers far exceed those of their hourly rate counterparts and that, in 
fact, a top tier of contingent fee lawyers comprising approximately 1/4 
to 1/3 of that bar, routinely obtains effective hourly rates of thousands 
of dollars;^^ 
16) that contingent fee lawyers engage in concerted efforts to hide 
their effective hourly rates from public view;^'' 
17) that the efforts at concealment of both effective hourly rates 
Assault on Fiduciary Protection], 
26 See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates and the Disciplinary 
System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1357 
(1996) [hereinafter Brickman, Disciplinary System], 
27 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, text accompanying rm. 150-51. 
28 See id, at n.l48, app. H. 
2^ See id, aXn,\Q, 
20 See id, at Tt,11, 
21 See id, at nn.39-107. 
22 &eW. atn.l7. 
22 See id, at n.l09. 
24 See id, at n.l5, app. C. 
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and risk levels incommensurate with risk premiums being routinely 
charged plays an important if not critical role in the tort reform wars 
currently being waged;^^ 
18) that while most tort reform proposals that have been advanced 
including those providing for: limits on punitive damages; restrictions 
on choosing venue; changes in the collateral source rule, joint and 
several liability, statutes of limitation, and class action procedures; are 
attacked by opponents of tort reform on the ground that they contract 
rights of tort claimants and thus deny "access to justice for these 
claimants, other proposals to reform the civil justice system that both 
implement dormant ethical and fiducial principles and protect 
consumers of legal services from price gouging by lawyers and which 
are not susceptible to this usual "sound bite" charge, nonetheless 
generate similar opposition;^^ and 
19) that the enormous increase in the effective rate of return 
realized by tort lawyers from contingent fee claiming has paralleled the 
simultaneous expansion in the scope of liability imposed under the tort 
system." 
All of these arguments, propositions, conclusions and proposals set 
the stage for the question which is the focus of this article: are 
contingent fees a function of a competitive market? To undertake this 
inquiry, I first examine the views expressed by scholars and 
commentators. I then list and analyze features of contingent fee 
financed tort claiming that are indicia of the existence of a 
noncompetitive market. In this article, I contend that the principal such 
indicator is the maintenance of uniform pricing in the form of standard 
contingent fees, generally ranging from thirty-three to 50 percent, 
depending on the jurisdiction. However, while I acknowledge that 
uniform pricing is consistent with the existence of both competitive and 
noncompetitive markets, I conclude that in the tort claiming market for 
tort claiming services, the function of uniform pricing is to generate 
substantial rents. I then examine other indicia of the existence of a 
noncompetitive market for tort claiming services, including: the absence 
of price advertising; the enormity of the increases in effective hourly 
rates over the past forty years which far exceed estimated increases in 
productivity or competence; the historical derivation of the standard one 
third (or higher) contingent fee; the absence of economic justification 
for uniform pricing such as reductions in agency costs or transactional 
costs; inelasticity in the pricing of tort claiming services in light of 
highly variable production costs as highlighted by a comparison of the 
responsiveness of pricing in the tort claiming market to significant 
35 See id. at text accompanying nn.20-21. 
36 See id. app. D. 
37 See ici. text accompanying rm. 1-6. 
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differences in the cost of producing specific services with the 
responsiveness of pricing in the real estate brokerage market to similar 
instances of highly varying production costs; and the payment of 
referral fees, a phenomenon which is largely confined to the contingent 
fee market, and the fact that lawyers who are willing to pay referral fees 
to other lawyers refuse to share such saved commission costs when they 
are directly retained by disintermediating clients. 
I then examine factors which inhibit the emergence of a price 
competitive market including: asymmetrical knowledge with respect to 
the value of claims; the lack of sophistication of most purchasers of tort 
claiming services; the utility of uniform pricing in misleading 
consumers as to the risk being assumed by the lawyer; and the signaling 
functions of uniform pricing including the branding of price cutters as 
slackers or as inferior in quality. 
I then examine the reasons for the persistence of uniform pricing in 
the face of the predictions of economists applying standard economic 
theory that some laivyers would undercut standard pricing thereby 
generating competitive behavior that would more closely align pricing 
with risk and the variable cost of producing the service. I attribute the 
persistence of uniform prieing to market failures and analyze the 
reasons for such failures. 
Finally, I examine the actions of the bar designed to prevent a 
competitive market from emerging. These actions include the 
maintenance of barriers to entry into the tort claiming market, 
prohibitions against the outright purchase of tort claims and adoption of 
rules of ethics effectively prohibiting price competition including 
prohibitions against providing financial assistance to clients and 
brokerage of lawyers' services for profit. 
I. Is THE MARKET FOR CONTINGENT FEE-FINANCED TORT CLAIMING 
SERVICES COMPETITIVE: COMPETING VIEWS 
Many scholars have advanced the view that the market for 
contingent fee financed tort claiming services is competitive. For 
example. Professor Charles Silver has contended that the contingency 
fee market is "highly competitive" [and] empirical evidence shows that 
plaintiffs' attorneys compete for business ... [and] strive to cut costs 
and risks."38 Professor Herbert Kritzer, a leading empirical researcher,^' 
Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2088-89 (2002) 
[hereinafter Silver, Civil Justice], His statement, undoubtedly correct, does not parry the thrust of 
the evidence I present in this article that contingency fee pricing is noncompetitive. Lawyers, 
including contingent fee lawyers, compete with each other for business and strive to become more 
efficient by reducing both risk and costs. However, as I later argue, they do not compete on the 
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has argued that the market system is adequate to bring down 
unreasonably high fees by the "obvious mechanism" of "price 
advertising which would enable clients to obtain relevant information 
"about fees... [to] make more informed choices.'"" Professor Mark 
Galanter, a leading torts scholar and widely cited opponent of tort 
reform,argued, albeit erroneously, that New York's high contingent 
fees which were in the 50 percent range, but which had dropped to 
approximately 33 1/3 percent in the early 1960s, had fallen victim to the 
competitive market for tort claiming services due to an increased supply 
of lawyers and other competitive "market forces."'*^ Contrary views 
have also been advanced.'*'' Moreover, a number of state supreme 
basis of price. 
Professor Herbert Kntzer has published extensively on the effective hourly rates realized 
by tort lawyers. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY. .. USES AND 
ABUSES ... CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONTINGENT FEE (Wisconsin Inst, for Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11-8, 1995); Contingent 
Fee Abuses: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) 
(statement of Herbert Kritzer) [hereinafter Kritzer Statement]. See also Herbert M. Kritzer, The 
Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998) 
[hereinafter Kntzer, The Wages of Risk]; Kntzer, Seven Myths, supra note 1. For a critique of 
Kritzer's data and conclusions, see generally Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1. 
Kntzer, The Wages of Risk, supra note 39, at 308. 
Id. at 307-09. Kntzer had long denied that tort lawyers' effective hourly rates exceeded 
that of their hourly rate counterparts and is widely cited for that proposition. See Brickman, 
Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n. 17. In the face of overwhelming empirical evidence, he 
has come to concede that some contingent fee lawyers are able to obtain very high and potentially 
unreasonable fees. See Kritzer, Seven Myths, supra note 1, at 772; Kritzer, The Wages of Risk, 
supra note 39, at 304. His solution, "price advertising," however, fails. As indicated infra note 
95, contingent fee lawyers do not engage in price advertising. 
See, e.g.. Marc S. Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and 
Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (1998) [hereinafter Galanter, Contingency Fee and Its 
Discontents]; Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don V 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 4 (1983); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD L REV 3 
(1986). 
•*3 See Galanter, Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, supra note 42, at 470 (hypothesizing 
that a drop in contingency fees in New York City from 50 percent to 33 percent was a result of 
"the increase in the supply of lawyers serving individual clients, the increased competition 
ushered in by the demise of fee schedules, the appearance of advertising, and a gradual increase 
in the sophistication of clients"). This is patently false. The reason for the drop in contingency 
fees was not a result of market forces but rather a rule promulgated by the Appellate Division of 
the New York Supreme Court to limit contingency fees in tort cases essentially to 33 and one-
third percent because market forces were ineffective in limiting contingency fees and legislative 
efforts to fix the runaway pricing were blocked by lawyers who controlled key legislative 
positions. For more discussion of the origin of New York's rule, see infra note 105; see also 
Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 106-07. In my judgment, had the New York courts 
not previously limited contingent fees to a maximum of 50 percent on the supercilious grounds 
that a fee of 50.1 percent would give the lawyer control over the lawsuit, the prevailing rate for 
contingent fees in tort cases would have been in the 60 to 75 percent range. 
*4 See, e.g.. In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 201 F. Supp.2d 861, 875-77 (2002) ("[T]he 
actual market for legal services departs rather sharply from the ideal conditions under which 
markets are efficient, and therefore in theory conducive to consumer welfare .... the market for 
contingent legal services especially among consumers, is highly uncompetitive . . . ."); Richard 
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courts, in the exercise of their authority to regulate the practice of law, 
have explieitly and implicitly rejected the view that the market for tort 
claiming services is competitive by imposing price caps on contingency 
fees.''5 
To resolve these competing views, I offer the following systematic 
and, to the extent possible, empirically based analysis of the market for 
tort claiming services. 
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR CONTINGENT FEE-FINANCED 
TORT CLAIMING SERVICES 
A. Competitive Markets: A Definition 
Freely competitive markets are characterized by many producers of 
goods or services which have qualities that are comparable and prices 
which are published and readily discovered. Consumers are fully 
informed of the qualities and prices and register their personal 
preferences through choices based on that perfect information. 
Producers respond to the consumer demand for information by 
campaigning aggressively to provide it, an effort that epitomizes 
interfirm competition. Free entry and exit by firms into and out of the 
industry is also a necessary eomponent of competitive markets, in order, 
inter alia, to diminish incentives for existing firms to collude.'*^ 
W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market For 
Champerty!, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 656-59 (1995) (the predominance of uniform contingent 
fee rates indicates the relevant market is not competitive); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: 
How The Market For Lawyers Distorts The Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 999 (2000): 
The market for lawyers is fundamentally noncompetitive. As a consequence of the 
complexity of legal reasoning and procedure, the profession's derived monopoly on the 
legitimate use of coercion, and the unification of the profession to serve the diverse 
needs for access to law, the price of law that emerges from the free market for lawyers 
is too high. 
Id. 
'*5 See, e.g., Florida Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility 
(Contingent Fees), 494 So. 2d 960, 961 (Fla. 1986) ("[T]his Court expressed its belief, (possibly, 
its hope) that lawyer advertising would create greater public awareness regarding attorneys' fees 
and services and that competition would provide a self-regulator on fees .... [S]uch does not 
appear to be the case."); Mark A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin and Irving Mark, Accidents, Money 
and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 
(1961) (because the assumption that competition would prevent abuses in setting contingent fees 
was not bome out. New York's Appellate Division, by rule, found it necessary to set limits on 
contingent fees). See also infra note 105 for a listing of other state rules and statutes limiting 
contingent fees and for further discussion of the circumstances surrounding promulgation of New 
York's rules capping contingent fee rates. 
46 See BEGG ET AL., ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 132-34. 
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B. The Market For Tort Claiming Services: An Introductory 
Summary 
While the market for tort claiming services is characterized by 
many producers of the services, virtually all of the other components 
necessary for the existence of a competitive market are not present. For 
example, the information that the consumer of the service requires in 
order to engage in price comparisons and meaningful bargaining is 
largely absent. Search costs are simply prohibitive. Consumers 
typically lack knowledge of the quality of tort lawyers and therefore are 
imable to make effective choices based upon differing quality levels. In 
addition, consumers cannot determine the prices that they are being 
charged in units which are meaningful to them such as (effective) 
hourly rates and have little knowledge of the value of the claims which 
they are partly selling to their lawyers, the amount of risk that the 
lawyer is assuming or the amount of time the lawyer reasonably 
anticipates devoting to the client's matter. Tort lawyers, who are 
experts in valuing claims, determining risk and estimating the time to be 
required to generate a settlement or verdict, take advantage of this 
asymmetrical knowledge in a number of ways. They decline to 
advertise competitive pricing and instead act collusively to generate 
rents by maintaining standard pricing. Lawyers' efforts to impose and 
maintain standard pricing are augmented by the message that such 
pricing conveys to consumers. That is, standard pricing signals to 
claimants that would-be price cutters may anticipate devoting less time 
to their claims or are inferior in quality and may, in either case, 
therefore obtain lower settlements. Lawyers' efforts to impose standard 
pricing are further augmented by an auxiliary function of standard 
pricing. It is an efficacious system for exaggerating risk and thereby 
justifying unearned risk premiums. Consumers, who lack sophistication 
in negotiating prices with lawyers, are therefore deterred from searching 
out price cutters who deviate from standard pricing and are often 
mislead into believing that the risk being assumed by the lawyer 
justifies the substantial risk premium that is incorporated into the 
standard price. 
Given the substantial absence of critical factors characterizing 
freely competitive markets, it appears unlikely that the market for tort 
claiming services would be price competitive. To confirm or reject this 
hypothesis, I next examine the tort claiming service market, beginning 
with a consideration of indicators of the lack of a competitive market. 
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C. Indicia Of An Uncompetitive Market For Tort Claiming Services 
1. Uniform Pricing 
The dominant feature of the market for contingent fee financed tort 
claiming services is that pricing of lawyers' services is uniform. 
Lawyers charge standard contingent fees in all personal injury litigation 
ranging from 33 1/3 to 50 percent depending on the jurisdiction.''^ 
While deviations are not unknown, they are comparatively rare.''^ This 
is especially the case when lawyers are presented with tort claims where 
liability is clear, damages are substantial and the lawyer anticipates 
having to devote only modest amounts of time to generate a near policy 
limits settlement offer. In these matters, windfall fees amounting to 
thousands of dollars an hour are obtained.^^ Seemingly in defiance of 
standard economic theory, in the world of contingent fees, the more 
lucrative the claim, the more inflexible the pricing.^® 
47 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n. 10. 
48 In the course of observing contingent fee practices, I have been informed by contingent fee 
lawyers that they sometimes reduce their standard fees in cases where there are substantial 
medical expenses and a client's net recovery is, by comparison, inadequate if not paltry. Some 
lawyers contend they routinely reduce their fees in such circumstances. While such fee reductions 
do exist, there is no way to determine the frequency of such reductions from currently available 
data. Moreover, there is anecdotal data that in cases where fees are substantial, lawyers rigidly 
maintain uniform pricing. See id. at n.l3. 
49 See id. 
50 For this conclusion, I rely on personal knowledge of the contingency fee market and on 
anecdotal evidence amassed over several decades of close inquiry. An illustrative and not 
imtypical example involves an undergroimd steam pipe explosion which spread asbestos across 
the Gramercy Park area of New York City in 1989. After initially denying the presence of 
asbestos, the owner of the steam pipe. Con Edison, acknowledged its responsibility. Once the 
presence of asbestos was confirmed, hundreds of residents in the immediate area had to abandon 
virtually all of their personal possessions and suffer displacement from their residences for 
several months. See Mirey A. Navarro, Gramercy Park's Refugees Long for Home, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 1989, at B1 (reporting that Con Edison projected costs for explosion cleanup and 
reimbursements to displaced Gramercy Park area residents to be in the $30 to $40 million range 
following August 19, 1989 steam pipe explosion which spewed cancer-causing asbestos 
throughout the neighborhood); see also David E. Pitt, Con Edison Takes Blame in Steam Blast, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1989, (Saturday, Late ed.) § 1, at 25 (recounting the three deaths caused by 
the accident, as well as the estimated 176 pounds of asbestos which were sprayed over Gramercy 
Park). Shortly after the explosion, lawyers descended on hotels and other locations where 
displaced residents were being housed and offered to represent them in their claims against the 
utility company. See Daniel Wise, Lawyers Gear Up to Handle Asbestos Claims; Experts Say 
Personal Injury, Property Claims Look Good; Outlook Grim for Psychic Trauma, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 
18, 1989, at 1 (stating that shortly following the explosion, "[i]n the race to sign up clients, some 
lawyers descended upon Gramercy Park Tike locusts'... peddling their ability to recover the 
'sun, moon and stars'"). Though the utility had admitted liability and the claim process largely 
consisted of documenting additional living costs, the value of abandoned personal possessions 
and the like—^pretty much what any home owner asserting a claim against a fire insurer would do 
in the event of a fire—the lawyers charged standard contingent fees of 33 1/3 percent. Fee 
bargaining occurred in only one instance of which 1 am aware. In that case, a lawyer who was 
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It is both a consequence of the lack of a competitive market for tort 
claiming services and an indictment of our tort system that whenever an 
egregious and undeniable act of medical malpractice causing severe 
injury occurs, a tort lawyer will obtain a million dollar or multi-million 
dollar fee^i irrespective of the effort anticipated to be required and the 
value, if any, that the lawyer adds to the value of the claim as existed 
when he was retained.^^ xhat is so because contingent fee percentages, 
being standard, therefore do not reflect differences in risk or in the 
anticipated costs for the production of the service being purchased or in 
the projected returns on the lawyer's investment. A lawyer who 
imdertakes to represent a severely injured claimant rendered paraplegic 
or quadriplegic where the settlement value of the claim is $10 million or 
more, charges the same standard contingent fee as when she represents 
a less severely injured claimant where the settlement value is only a 
tenth or twentieth as much though the liability risk and amount of 
anticipated effort are substantially the same for both claims. The former 
will usually yield a substantially higher effective hourly rate because 
pricing is inflexible and does not vary on the basis of differences in risk 
or the cost of production of the purchased service. 
Thus, the existence of a uniform price for tort claiming services 
may be seen as an anomaly and evidence of a market failure.^^ The 
likelihood of success in prosecuting personal injury claims ranges from 
zero to 100%. Lawyers, however, do not randomly select their cases 
from among those offered by claimants. Instead, they carefully screen 
claims, rejecting more than half, in particular, those claims with a low 
likelihood of success or low anticipated return on their investments.^"* 
among the victims, assembled a group of other victims to join with him in securing legal services. 
A discounted fee in that case was negotiated. In the other representations, not even economics of 
scale were shared with claimants in the form of discounted fees. No local bar association ever 
publicly suggested that it would be improper, let alone imethical to charge standard contingent 
fees in such circumstances. The Bar Association of the City of New York provided free 
counseling for residents with regard to their legal rights. I urged the Association that as part of 
their pro bono services, they inform claimants that the one third "contingent" fee being charged 
was simply price gouging and that residents should be encouraged to bargain for far lower 
percentages. I further suggested that the Association state that fees in excess of 10 percent were 
presumptively unreasonable in light of the purely administrative nature of the claim process and 
the complete absence of risk. The Bar Association did not act on either recommendation. 
51 For discussion of the frequency of million dollar fees, see Brickman, Effective Hourly 
Rates, supra note 1, app. F. 
52 For discussion of the zero-based accounting system used by tort lawyers to justify 
assessing their contingent fees against the entire recovery irrespective of whether that recovery 
includes substantial value that existed prior to any value contributed by the lawyer, see id. at n. 11. 
53 See Richard W. Painter, supra note 44, at 657-59 (arguing that in a competitive market the 
contingency fee charged by attorneys should vary based on differences in the size of claim, the 
level of risk, the amount of time devoted to the case, as well as the skill of the attomey, and that 
"a competitive market in which fees consistently are the same percentage of judgment or 
settlement (for example, 33 percent) would be unusual"). 
54 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. FI. 
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The screening process is so effective that lawyers prevail in 70 to 90 
percent of the cases they accept and obtain nearly 100% reimbursement 
of litigation expenses advanced including expenses advanced in cases in 
which they do not prevail.^^ Arguably, if competitive market forces 
were effectively operational in the contingent fee setting process, the 
percentages charged by lawyers would come to reflect, albeit roughly, 
the likelihood of success in each case.^^ In fact, the percentage fees 
charged are uniform and differences in the likelihood of success in the 
cases represented have no impact on the contingent percentage.^' With 
few exceptions, price is unrelated to risk. 
Nonetheless, the fact that contingent fees are standardized does 
not, in itself, indicate that the market for contingent fee financed tort 
claiming is not competitive. Indeed, the fact of uniform pricing is 
compatible both with the hypothesis that the market is not competitive 
and its opposite, that such pricing is the result of a competitive market 
reaching an equilibrium price. 
One argument advanced in support of the competitive market 
model is that uniform pricing in markets is efficient, because it lowers 
transactional costs and minimizes agency costs.^^ For example, in the 
55 Id. 
5® See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J. B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent 
Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1139-40 (1970) ("Under competitive 
conditions the same percentage fee would not be charged for both [high value and low value] 
cases. ). Other factors would also be important, including, for example, the value of the claim, 
the amount of lawyer time that would be necessary, the amount of litigation expenses that the 
lawyer would have to advance and thereby put at risk, the lawyer's workload, and whether a 
quick settlement, even though for a modest sum, were in the offering. 
57 See supra notes 47-52. See also Hendricks v. Sefton, 180 Cal. App. 2d 526 (1960) (lawyer 
quoted his personal injury fee as one-third though he had not met the potential client and was 
unaware at that point of the facts in the case); F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS & RESPONSIBILITIES 21-22 (1964); Franklin, 
Chanin & Mark, supra note 45, at 132; John Leubsdorf, The Contingent Factor in Attorney Fees 
Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 491 (1981); Note, The Contingent Fee: Disciplinary Rule, Ethical 
Consideration, or Free Competition?, 1979 UTAHL. REV. 547, 553 n.34. 
5^ See Saul Levmore, Commissions And Conflicts In Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real 
Estate Brokers, Underwriters, And Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J. L. & ECON. 503, 505-06 (1991) 
[hereinafter Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts]-, Charles Silver, Control Fees? No, Let The 
Free Market Do Its Job, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A17: 
One should be slow to infer a lack of competition from these facts ... the first sentence 
appears in the article after the second sentence that percentages are uniform across 
geographical areas, and that these lawyers charge the same percentages in all cases 
even though different cases entail different risk.... Those people who understand 
markets do not usually shout "conspiracy" upon discovering a uniform practice in a 
trade. They realize that competition often generates uniformity that works to the 
advantage of buyers and sellers. Uniform percentage fees also may be desirable 
products of competition. They entail low bargaining costs, the align the interests of 
lawyers and clients in contexts in which clients have difficulty monitoring lawyers' 
behavior, and they enhance client confidence by equalizing lawyers' incentives across 
caseloads. 
Id. 
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real estate brokerage market, the contingency fee is a standard 
commission of 6 percent of the sale price of the house.^^ Arguably, 
standard pricing of brokers' services in this market is an efficient way to 
reduce agency costs, that is, the costs to principals (home owners) of 
monitoring the efforts of real estate brokers.^® If commission rates were 
individualized, home owners who entered into contracts with real estate 
brokers for the sale of their homes would be concerned that brokers 
would devote greater efforts to selling homes of owners who had agreed 
to pay higher commissions. "Uniformity in rewards mitigates the 
problem of conflicts among principals because joint revenue 
maximization is much more certain if an agent receives similar 
compensation from several principals."®' In addition, uniform pricing 
of brokerage services may be seen to minimize transactional costs by 
displacing more costly individualized bargaining and by reducing 
search costs home by home owners. 
Nonetheless, there are multiple reasons for concluding that 
economic justifications for maintenance of uniform pricing in real estate 
brokerage do not similarly justify uniform pricing in the provision of 
contingent fee financed tort claiming. If such justifications are not 
present, that is, the quest for efficiency or maximization of joint welfare 
is not the underlying basis for the maintenance of uniform pricing by 
contingent fee lawyers, then the alternative hypothesis that presents 
itself is that uniform pricing is a quest for rents in the form of a far 
larger share of the tort claiming pie. 
a. Uniform Contingent Fee Pricing Does Not Meaningfully Reduce 
Agency Costs 
Even if it is the case that uniform pricing of real estate brokerage 
services is efficient, uniform contingency fee rates do not meaningfully 
59 See Patrick Barta, Home Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2001, at R12. 
^0 See Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 509 n.l2. Others see the 
existence of such uniform pricing as indicative of collusion among real estate brokers. Compare 
Owen R. Phillips & Henry N. Butler, The Law and Economics of Residential Real Estate Markets 
in Texas: Regulation and Antitrust Implications, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 641, 649 (1984) 
(noting that though brokerage commissions are uniform, "[i]t is difficult, nevertheless, to embrace 
the conclusion that uniform prices are sufficient proof of the existence of collusion," and that "it 
is not in the interest of one firm to lower prices if it knows that rival firms would follow to 
maintain their market share [thus it] is in each broker's interest to maintain the status quo"), with 
Bruce M. Owen, Kickbacks Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real 
Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 946-48 (1977) (multiple listing services enable real estate 
agents to share information and this facilitates maintenance of uniformity of prices by price-fixing 
and collusion). 
Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 505. 
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reduce agency costs in the tort claiming services market.® This is so, in 
part, because contingency fee lawyers, while charging uniform rates, do 
not apply their time and capital in equal portions to each of their cases. 
Instead, they allocate their time and capital as if they were charging 
differential contingency fee rates. Indeed, their behavior may be best 
understood if one concludes that they are, in reality, charging 
substantially differentiated fees. 
To diversify and control risk and generate predictable income 
streams, contingency fee lawyers assemble portfolios of cases,^^ 
carefully screening claims^'^ and selecting only those which they expect 
to generate returns at least equal to their opportunity costs. As part of 
the selection process, lawyers estimate how much time will be needed 
and how much capital will have to be advanced for litigation costs.®^ 
After selections are made, lawyers constantly reevaluate the cases in 
their portfolios and rearrange their investments going forward. Cases 
that appeared more promising at the outset but which depreciated in 
value as the result of newly discovered information will thereafter have 
less time and capital appropriated to them.®^ And conversely, cases 
which promised profitable but not super profitable returns, which 
appear later to be more promising, will be allocated additional time and 
capital. 
For a discussion of agency issues raised by contingent fee litigation, see Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Some Agency Problems In Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189(1987). 
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n. 149. 
64 Id. app. H. 
65 Lawyers' screening of elaims to determine whether to accept a case is not only a function 
of the estimated effective hourly rate that it will yield but also of the projected eash flow from, 
and degree of risk of, the current portfolio. Any portfolio of eases may be evaluated in terms of 
levels of risk—a measure that is analogous to the "beta" measure of stock portfolios or other 
measures of stock portfolio or mutual fund volatility. If a prospective case appears likely to 
generate a high reward but is also high risk, then the decision whether to accept the case is a 
function of the level of risk of the current portfolio (as well as the lawyer's own level of risk 
tolerance). A lawyer will have a greater propensity for accepting a case that will require a 
substantial expenditure of capital and which is high risk relative to the risk level of his portfolio if 
it offers an at least commensurately high reward and his current portfolio can be expected to 
generate the necessary cash flow to cover the outlays required by the new case. 
66 A lawyer who discovers to his dismay that a contingent fee case that he aceepted is 
insufficiently remunerative has incentive to shirk. To be sure, ethical codes require that lawyers 
zealously advance their clients' interests; shirking is unethical. In reality, however, shirking is 
commonplace and is only the subjeet of disciplinary proceedings when a lawyer does it 
repeatedly and, as well, engages in other egregious behavior that attracts the attention of 
disciplinary counsel. Client reactions to shirking are well known. They complain that they are 
unable to eontaet their lawyer, that she is always "in conference," never available to take their 
phone calls, does not return phone calls or letters, etc. Clients faced with such behavior 
sometimes seek out other lawyers. In some jurisdictions, contingency fee lawyers who discover 
that they have invested in a clunker can not only unload their burden by inducing the client to 
terminate them for their inaction, but can also then assert a right to a quantum meruit fee even if 
the claim is abandoned or a second lawyer takes it to trial and there is a defense verdict. See 
Lester Brickman, Setting The Fee When The Client Discharges A Contingency Fee Lawyer, 41 
EMORY L.J. 367, 382-85, 393-97 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman, Setting the Fee]. 
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Empirical evidence supports this view of lawyers' portfolio 
strategy. In a series of federal tax cases, the courts analyzed the degree 
of recovery of litigation expenses that contingent fee lawyers had 
advanced in cases which they had accepted. In one case,^^ the Fifth 
Circuit examined the circumstances and conditions under which the 
payments were advanced and noted that the lawyers had exercised "a 
high degree of selectivity" by carefully evaluating the strength of each 
claim that they were representing and limiting the amounts of expenses 
advanced to under the expected recovery.®^ The court noted that 
"although reimbursement was tied to the recovery of a client's claim, 
assistance was granted only to those whose claims would in all 
probability be successfully concluded."^^ The record revealed that the 
firm recovered over 96 percent of the litigation expenses that it had 
advanced.^® Other firms' experiences are comparable.''' In order to 
recover virtually all of the litigation expenses it advanced, these firms 
necessarily differentially invested in their portfolios of cases, investing 
more capital (and presumably time) in those 70 percent or more of cases 
in which they prevailed than in the 10 to 30 percent in which they did 
not prevail.^2 
Effectively then, contingency fee lawyers perceive their cases as 
generating returns measured, for comparative purposes, in hourly rates. 
At any and every moment in time, as part of the process of evaluating 
their portfolios' expected returns, contingent fee lawyers estimate the 
projected hourly rate to be earned for each case by estimating the 
amount of time to be required to generate a settlement or take the case 
to trial, the settlement or trial value of the case (which takes litigation 
risk into account), the lawyer's share thereof—a function of the uniform 
percentage charged, and the amount of new capital to put at risk in the 
Burnett V. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 9, 12 (1964), remanded, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966), cert, 
denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966). 
68 Burnett, 356 F.2d at 760. 
69 Id. 
^6 See id. at 759. On this basis, the court concluded that the advances were nondeductible 
loans rather than deductible business expenses. 
9' For cases adopting the same approach and reaching the same result as Burnett, see Monek 
V. Comm'r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 582, 584 (1966), in which a lawyer recovered approximately 98 
percent litigation expenses advanced, and Canelo v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 217, 218 (1969), ajf'd447 
F.2d. 484 (9th Cir. 1971) (90 percent recovery). In Boccardo v. Comm'r, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 
1995), the record indicated that the plaintiff firm had prevailed in 70 percent of their cases but 
recovered 80-90 percent of all expenses advanced including expenses advanced in cases where 
they did not prevail. 
'^2 There is additional evidence in support of the proposition that lawyers differentially invest 
in cases based on the perceived likelihood of success. See, e.g., website of Advocate Capital, 
Inc., available at http://www.advocatecapital.com (Advocate Capital provides loans to lawyers to 
cover litigation expenses, using the "case as collateral"). Advocate Capital requires lawyers to 
repay loans even if the case is lost; however, the website implies that this should not be overly 
burdensome on attorneys, citing their "experience that a minimal amount of money is invested in 
cases that are ultimately abandoned." Id. 
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form of advances for litigation costs. 
Thus, while contingency fee uniformity has an effect on the 
calculation of the estimated effective hourly rate value of each case, its 
effect on minimizing agency costs is marginal. Lawyers have differing 
levels of incentives to invest time and money in clients' cases and do 
not devote uniform efforts to advancing their clients' interests.''^ 
Instead, the level of effort is a function of maximization of their 
effective hourly rates of return. Uniform contingency fee rates are not 
designed to, and do not maximize, joint revenue.'''^ Rather, they 
maximize attorneys' rents at their principals' expense. 
b. Price Inelasticity in the Face of Highly Variable Production Costs 
In freely competitive markets for uniform or easily substitutable 
goods or services, prices would gravitate towards an equilibrium 
Cf. Kritzer, Seven Myths, supra note 1, at 11 A. 
lA An alternative argument can be made that while imiform pricing results in overcharging 
some clients, the excessive fees thus generated subsidize other clients whose claims would not 
otherwise gain representation. Therefore, while some clients net less, others net sufficiently more 
so that the cross-subsidization function of excessive fees may be seen to maximize total revenues 
generated by tort claiming. The overcompensation argument was approved in a once leading but 
now antiquated book on contingent fees. See FREDERICK B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES 
FOR LEGAL SERVICES 182 (1964) ("[T]he idea of using overcharges of some clients to offset 
undercharges to others does not seem an unfair way to support a system of providing competent 
legal services to clients who need them."). We recognize the overcompensation argument as a 
variation of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." As George Bernard Shaw noted, taking from Peter to 
pay Paul always meets with the approval of Paul. Thoughts on Business Life, FORBES, Apr. 23, 
1984, at 174. It is instructive to consider in the contingent fee context just who Peter and Paul 
are. Peter, of course, is the client being overcharged by attorneys' fees unjustified by the risk 
borne by the attomey. It may be thought that Paul is a subsequent client with a high risk claim 
who, but for the lawyer's overcharging Peter, would not gain representation. If his claim prevails, 
he has surely gained a windfall—^but it is a one-time windfall. The lawyer is also a beneficiary, 
claiming one-third to one-half of the gross amount. But unlike the subsequent client, the lawyer 
is a repeat beneficiary. His stake in the process far exceeds that of the subsequent client. 
Moreover, whether or not he accepts a subsequent client's claim is a function of the effective 
hourly rate he anticipates receiving in that case. There is no bookkeeping credit that the lawyer 
applies to subsidize case two because he overcharged Peter in case one. Accordingly, it is more 
correct to regard Paul as the attomey who overcharges Peter and who may therefore accept a 
future higher-risk case that he would otherwise be less likely to have accepted were he not flush 
with the funds that were mulcted from Peter but who will only do so if he concludes that it will 
generate a fee at least equal to his opportunity cost. As for the propriety of robbing Peter, an 
attomey owes each and every client an obligation not to charge that client any more than a fair 
and reasonable fee. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 32 n.5. Moreover, the cross-
subsidization argument itself is specious because contingent fee percentages are typically set 
without regard to risk (and to the extent risk is considered, cases where risk is sufficiently high 
that a one-third to one-half contingency fee offers insufficient compensation, are simply not 
taken). In other words, in cases where risks are not commensurate with and do not justify 
charging standard contingent fee rates, contingent fee lawyers typically "rob" each such client 
without allocating any of the booty to later clients. 
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pointJ' Inefficient producers would tend to be forced out of the market 
and the costs of production of efficient producers would tend towards 
uniformity. The market for tort claiming services, however, is quite 
different. There is enormous variation in the costs of production of, and 
the rates of return realized from, tort elaiming services. One claim may 
present substantial risk, a need for a high investment level but very high 
reward possibilities; another may present identical risk and reward 
probabilities but require only a modest investment. Still another may 
involve little or no risk, a need for little investment and high promise of 
reward, thereby generating an antieipated windfall fee. In a competitive 
market the prices charged by producers of these services would vary on 
the basis of differenees in production costs and anticipated rewards.^^ 
However, prices for tort claiming services do not vary. They are 
standard in a community and generally range from 33 to 50 percent.'"' 
Because low cost, very high return claim representation is priced the 
same as higher cost, lower return claim representation, the former 
generate substantial rents. 
To be sure, levels of risk assumed do not vary over the entire risk 
continuum. As has been pointed out, in assembling their portfolios of 
cases, contingent fee lawyers carefully screen claims, rejecting more 
than half of those offered and selecting only those which they anticipate 
w i l l  y i e l d  a  r e t u r n  a t  l e a s t  e q u a l  t o  t h e i r  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s . T h a t  
lawyers thus screen out high risk-low reward cases does not detraet 
from the proposition that prices do not vary on the basis of substantial 
anticipated differences in produetion costs—as they would, at least to 
some extent, in a competitive market. 
Equilibrium price is the price at which, in a competitive market, the quantity supplied 
equals the quantity demanded. When price lies above this equilibrium, sellers must decrease the 
price in order to increase demand, thereby enabling sale of a quantity for which profits cover 
output costs. Likewise, when price lies below the equilibrium, demand exceeds supply and 
sellers are able to increase price until the equilibrium price is reached. See BEGG ET AL., 
ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 32-34. Thus, substantially uniform pricing is a feature of some 
competitive markets. For example, gasoline prices in a given locality congregate around an 
equilibrium price. Id. When price of a uniform product diverges among competitors, the 
interaction of supply and demand in the competitive free market provides an incentive to change 
prices towards the equilibrium price. The competitor that sells at the lowest price will have the 
greatest demand. However, to meet that demand, it will have to increase supply and in turn 
increase its output costs. At a certain price below equilibrium, output costs will exceed profit, 
creating an incentive to decrease supply in order to increase price toward that of the equilibrium. 
Id. 
26 See supra note 56. 
22 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
28 See supra notes 63-66. 
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c. Price Rigidity in the Face of Variable Costs and Rewards: A 
Comparison of Uniform Pricing in the Tort Claiming Market and the 
Real Estate Brokerage Market 
As with tort claiming services where pricing is uniform, real estate 
brokers charge a standard contingent fee: a 6 percent sales commission. 
As considered above, there is some basis for concluding that uniform 
brokerage service pricing is efficient in that it reduces both agency costs 
and transactional costs,''^ even though, as noted, these arguments do not 
apply to the tort claiming market.^" Other differences in the two 
markets may also be usefully explored. In particular, the considerable 
differences in the responsiveness of each fee setting process to 
competitive pressures, and the opportunity in the respective markets to 
negotiate individualized prices in place of standard ones. If real estate 
brokerage rates represent an equilibrium price that, on average, provides 
reasonable compensation to brokers, then a projected rate of return that 
is substantially higher may result in negotiation of a lower price because 
the added transactional costs of negotiating a more individualized 
bargain are thus justified. If uniform contingency fees are not an 
equilibrium price but are, instead, a collusively maintained price 
designed to generate market rents, then we would expect lawyers to 
reject bargaining out of the standard rate even when a substantial rate of 
return, disproportionate to risk, is anticipated. Both expectations are 
borne out by industry practices. 
In the case of expensive homes, instead of the standard 6 percent 
brokers' commission, a lower rate, 5 percent and even 4 percent, is 
usually charged.^' This reflects the fact that the increased compensation 
from selling an expensive home for a standard commission may not be 
justified by any increased amount of work to be done by the broker. 
Accordingly, the parties bargain for an individualized rate reflective of 
the specific elements of those transactions. This is decidedly not the 
case in the tort claiming market. In the comparable case for tort 
lawyers, that is, where the lawyer's expected retum is substantial 
because of the seriousness of the injury, the absence of meaningful 
liability risk and the likelihood of settling the claim without the need for 
a substantial time expenditure, attempts to secure a lower contingency 
fee are generally rebuffed.^^ This, too, indicates the absence of a 
See supra note 58. 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 61-73. 
81 See Hamiah Pons, Banishing The "B-Word": Your Broker as Selling Partner, THE 
COOPERATOR, Nov. 2002, at 18, 19. 
82 One occasionally finds anecdotal evidence that because of family ties, tort lawyers will 
discoimt rates but there is no evidence that this practice is widespread. Moreover, as has been 
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competitive market. 
An additional comparison of the sensitivity of uniform pricing in 
each industry to competitive pressures further supports this conclusion. 
In the case of brokers, competitive pressures have significantly 
impacted commission rates.^^ poj- example, recent developments in the 
use of the Internet have produced a 25 percent lowering of standard 
commissions.^'* Lawyers' standard contingency fee rates, however, 
remain unaffected by the Intemet. Indeed, if contingent fee lawyers 
were threatened with similar kinds of competitive pressures as are now 
affecting real estate brokers, they would simply bar the potentially 
competitive structure.^^ 
Contrast the absence of price advertising by contingent fee 
lawyers^^ with the following advertisement:^' 
noted, in cases where the client ends up with an insubstantial recovery after payment of 
substantial medical expenses, lawyers do discount their fees. See supra note 48. However, this is 
not the case when windfall fees are anticipated or obtained. See text accompanying supra notes 
48-52. 
^3 Most homes sellers know by now that the traditional 6 percent real estate commission has 
basically become the "suggested list price" for real estate listings. And while most brokerage 
firms still push for a 6 percent commission, the amount the seller and broker finally agree upon 
can end up being considerably less. 
Beyond the traditional, full-service brokerage firms, a number of companies now offer 
their services at a variety of commission levels, fixed charges or some combination of 
the two. The levels of service vary widely, and may or may not provide inclusion on 
the local multiple listing service. Competition for the home seller's business is taking 
many forms. 
"Commission price wars between full-service brokerages have infiltrated real estate 
markets across the country," ... a Miami real estate consultant, wrote in Realty Times, 
an Intemet based real estate joumal. "In an effort to gamer a larger swath of market, 
attract attention and aimihilate the competition, many brokerages are slashing fees by 
25 percent or more." 
Jay Romano, Under 6 %, What Do Sellers Get?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at RE5. 
^4 "Discount real-estate brokerages have been operating on the Web for years. However, 
their growth has been severely restricted in part because they generally don't have access to the 
exclusive listings that members of the National Association of Realtors share." Patrick Barta, 
Realtors Pressured to Cut Commissions: Low-Cost Competitors Cain Ground, Undercutting 
Traditional 6% Fee; a Cash Rebate for Buyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at Bl. A Web site 
has been created which has gained access to Multiple Listing Services ("MLS") by hiring local 
brokers who join local Realtor associations and thus qualify for access to the MLS. This site 
typically charges sellers no more than 4.5 percent in commission, a 25 percent discount off of the 
standard rate. Patrick Barta, Home Rules: Real Estate Listings on the Web are Loosening the 
Crip Realtors Have Long Had on the Market, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2001, at R12. The success of 
this venture is leading to additional such ventures. See id. "Many Realtors also are starting to 
offer 'fee-for-service' plans, in which customers can do some of the home-searching on their own 
and pay a reduced commission only for the Realtor services they use." Id. In addition, a 
mainstream broker, Coldwell Banker, has recently introduced a web-based brokerage that offers 
discounted fees in Pennsylvania and Illinois. See Barta, supra, Nov. 12., 2002. 
5ee /«/ra section VI. 
See infra note 93. 
See advertisement posted on a Metro-North commuter train mnning between New York 
City and Brewster, N.Y. (last observed on Feb. 19, 2003). See also YHD, Advertisement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at 19 (describing "a $12 million multi-million advertising and marketing 
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At 6%, are you using your friend in 
Real Estate, or are they using you? 
REAL ESTATE 
2% Commission 
1-800-call YHD YHD.COM 
Over the course of thousands of advertisements by contingent fee 
lawyers costing hundreds of millions of dollars, no contingent fee 
lawyer has ever published even a remotely comparable advertisement. 
Indeed, contingent fee lawyers do not advertise their prices.^^ 
d. Referral Fees As Rents: A Product of Uniform Pricing 
Though tort claims are generally not assignable and lawyers are the 
only permissible partial purchasers,^^ tort lawyers maintain an exclusive 
and active secondary market in tort claims. Indeed, many tort lawyers 
vigorously seek out clients with the intent of selling off the claims to 
other lawyers who will do the actual negotiating or litigating and who 
will pay them a portion of the contingent fee.^" Commission costs, aka, 
"referral fees," which typically range from 30 to 50 percent of the 
campaign providing maximum exposure for listings")-
See infra note 95. 
89 See infra section VLB. 
90 See Matter of Fuchsberg & Fuchsberg, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 2003, at 21 (indicating that a well 
known New York plaintiff law firm routinely pays a 50 percent referral fee). A preeminent 
personal injury law firm has indicated that it pays out 28 percent of its gross fee income to 
referring lawyers. Andrew Blum, Big Bucks, But. . . Cash Flow a Problem, NAT L L.J., April 3, 
1989, at 1; see also Brillhart v. Hudson, 169 Colo. 329, (1969); In re Kaye, 266 N.Y.S.2d 69 
(1966), vacated, 386 U.S. 17 (1967); MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 
143-46 (1968); JEROME CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 200 (1966); F.B. MACKINNON, 
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 180-81(1964); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER 
AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 99-100 (1974); Blackburn, Referral Fees An Abuse of the 
Public Trust, 54 FLA. B.J. 235, 235 (1980) ("In most such arrangements, the referring attorney 
will do almost nothing to justify any fee, although it will usually be decided in advance that he 
(she) will eventually receive 40-50 percent of the total attomeys' fees."); John Grady, Some 
Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LITIGATION 22-23 (Summer 1976); Frederick N. 
Halstrom, Referral Fees Are a Necessary Evil, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (1985) ( [Lawyers] 
customarily divide legal fees in tort actions based on a percentage agreement regardless of each 
lawyer's comparative efforts and cost disbursements."). See also Yeazell, supra note 3, at 203 
(contending that the plaintiffs' bar has used referrals and fee splitting to achieve a network of 
expertise that replicates many of the advantages of larger firms). 
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contingent fee,^' far exceed typical commission costs and finders' fees 
in other commercial endeavors. Were contingent fee pricing subject to 
competitive forces, the lawyers who purchase the claims in the 
secondary market could be expected to share some of the saved 
commission costs with claimants who seek to capture at least some of 
these commissions by bypassing the business finder and going directly 
to the lawyer-litigator. Despite the substantial savings realized from 
disintermediation, lawyer-litigators who routinely agree to pay thirty to 
50 percent of their fee when the case is referred to them, just as 
routinely refuse to discount their standard rates when the claimant 
comes directly to them. This further evidences the existence of a 
substantial rents component in the standard contingent fee.^^ 
2. The Absence of Price Advertising 
Competitive markets virtually always feature price (and quality) 
advertising by suppliers of goods and services.jf ^he tort claiming 
market were competitive, we would expect to see lawyers' advertising 
their prices and offering "special" deals to attract business.^^ 
Contingency fee lawyers, however, do not engage in competitive fee 
advertising. In fact, they simply do not mention price in their 
advertisements.^^ xhey rely instead on general public knowledge that 
91 Id. 
92 Payment of referral fees is a phenomenon largely confined to contingency fee lawyers. 
Hourly rate lawyers do not pay referral fees to other lawyers who refer clients to them (though 
they may reciprocate by referring clients to lawyers who have sent them clients). The difference 
in business practice is accounted for by the rents that contingency fee lawyers obtain. The market 
for hourly rate fee services, is by comparison, quite competitive. 
93 As noted above, a leading empirical researcher on contingent fee pricing has argued that 
the market system is adequate to curb excessive pricing by the "obvious mechanism of price 
advertising" so that clients could obtain relevant information "about fees... [to] make more 
informed choices." See Kritzer, The Wages of Risk, supra note 39, at 308. 
94 It may be argued as a counter to my argument that physicians also do not advertise prices 
and that it does not therefore follow that the market for their services is not competitive. 
However, most physicians' services are paid for by third party instu-ers. Consumers have become 
accustomed in such a market to largely ignore price—a condition which is undergoing change. 
Moreover, and most importantly, most physicians simply do not advertise at all whereas tort 
lawyers advertise extensively. Those physicians that do advertise, most notably dermatologists 
and podiatrists, do include the equivalent of price advertising in their ads, namely that they cut 
their prices by accepting or participating widely in various medical insurance plans. If at some 
point many physicians do come to widely advertise their services and do not include information 
about price, then the argument would have more cogency. 
95 See Jeffirey O'Cormell, Carlos M. Brown, & Michael D. Smith, Yellow Page Ads as 
Evidence of Widespread Overcharging By The Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar—and a Proposed 
Solution, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 423 (1999/2000) (reporting a survey of yellow page phone 
advertisements which indicates that virtually no price competition exists among attomeys who 
charge contingency fees). In fact, just a single ad out of the 1,425 studied, or 0.07 percent, gave 
any indication whatsoever that the advertising attomey would be willing to bargain with potential 
90 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
fees are standard and amount to ione third of the recovery. For those not 
so informed, a visit to a tort lawyer's office provides the following fee 
information: we charge the going rate, one third of any recovery; that is 
the same as what other tort lawyers charge. Though some claimants do 
shop aroimd for lower pricing, they quickly find out that lawyers are 
unwilling to bargain over the fee percentage.^^ As a consequence of tort 
lawyers' practices, claimants are discouraged from seeking lower prices 
by price shopping and bargaining because they have learned what 
lawyers have intended for them to perceive: that there is an industry­
wide practice of maintaining standard pricing and price shopping is 
therefore futile. Indeed, the fact that fees are standard has been cited by 
a state supreme court as the basis for concluding that a standard 
contingency fee was fair because it was what all other plaintiff lawyers 
in the community charged.®'^ 
3. The Enormous Increase in Effective Hourly Rates 
Also bellying the existence of a competitive market for tort 
claiming services is the enormous increase in the effective hourly rates 
realized by tort lawyers over the past forty years. In the 1960-2001 
period, inflation-adjusted hourly rates of tort lawyers have increased 
1000% to 1400%,^^ even as the risk of nonrecovery, though remaining 
essentially stable, has decreased materially in products liability and 
clients with regard to the fee which would be charged. See id. at 426-27, 430. See also Judyth 
Pendell, Price Colluder, Esq.: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Increasingly Advertise but Rarely Compete. 
And Bar Associations Shy Away from Helping Litigants Shop, FORBES, July 23, 2001, at 34 
(reporting the results of an informal poll conducted by the Manhattan Institute that of six lawyer 
referral services contacted, which receive approximately 400,000 calls per year, none provide 
written information about fees). 
It is a common practice among contingent fee lawyers to have the contingent fee 
percentage included on a pre-printed standard retainer agreement used by that lawyer and to then 
fill in the client's name, address and a brief description of the nature of the claim on blank lines in 
the agreement before having the claimant sign it. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP & JEFFREY B. 
BREMAN, THE STORY OF A CIVIL CASE: DOMINGUEZ V. SCOTT'S FOOD STORES, INC. 8 (3d ed. 
2001) (a law school text listing a model contingency fee agreement in a tort claim, which includes 
a preprinted portion in which the contingent fee is: "ONE THIRD (1/3)... [of] amounts received 
in settlement. . . and FORTY (40 percent) per cent . . . if. . . collected . . . after suit is filed"). 
Most consumer organizations, for example. Consumers Union which publishes Consumer 
Reports, that might be expected to represent consumers' interests in the tort claiming process by 
focusing public attention on lawyers' price gouging and taking the lead in seeking rethess in the 
political arena, do not do so perhaps because of their close ties to plaintiff lawyers. 
'7 See Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1417, 1429-30 (1991) (describing how a state supreme court used the fact of standard 
pricing—and the consequent futility of searching for competitive pricing—to justify the fairness 
of a standard contingent fee; according to the court, the fact that contingency fees are standard 
means that they are fair and, presumably, the conclusion that they are fair justifies their 
uniformity). 
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. A. 
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medical malpractice litigation—areas of praetiee whieh generate the 
highest eontingent fees.^^ To be sure, some component of that inerease 
reflects increases in opportunity costs as well as in the inereased 
competence of the torts bar'"® whieh merit an inerease in the market rate 
of return. But the increases in effeetive hourly rates and incomes would 
appear to well exeeed any conceivable earned inerease in the market 
rate of return. To conelude, therefore, that standard contingent fees 
yield a eompetitive rate of return today, one would have to conclude 
that (1) 40 years ago, tort lawyers were being substantially 
undercompensated for risk, or (2) that there has been a substantial 
inerease in the risk assumed by eontingent fee lawyers, justifying a far 
higher rate of return, or (3) that current pricing of tort claiming services 
has come to inelude substantial rents. There is no empirieal or other 
basis for maintaining that tort lawyers were previously significantly 
undercompensated; moreover, there is a considerable basis for 
eoncluding that contingency fee risk has not only not increased but has 
declined.'"' Accordingly, to the extent the enormous increase in 
effective hourly rates exeeeds the competence-merited inereased market 
rate of return of the torts bar, that excess is a function of rent-seeking 
behavior. 
4. The Historieal Derivation of the Standard Contingent Fee 
The final factor I advance as an indicator that the market for tort 
claiming services is not eompetitive is the derivation of the standard 
contingent fee. If the standard one third fee were an equilibrium price, 
we would expeet to find historieal evidence of price fluctuation, both up 
and down, as the equilibrium point was approached. This is deeidedly 
not the case. Tracing the historieal development of the standard one-
third eontingent fee eonfirms the conclusion that it did not result from 
the operation of eompetitive market forces. For the better part of the 
approximately 15 0-year-existence of contingent fees in the United 
States, the percentages charged by lawyers have varied neither on the 
basis of competitive pressures nor on the likelihood of success in each 
case, but on the notion of what lawyers have felt comfortable charging 
within the eonfines of a judicial regulatory mechanism that essentially 
^ Id. app. B. 
100 Cf. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, supra note 3, at 201-02 ("A glance at the 1,200-
page directory of the American Trial Lawyers Association, with on-line access, fields of 
specialization, and cross-indexing of members, gives one a glimpse into the expertise and the sub-
specialization achieved by what was once a marginal, and marginally competent, group of 
lawyers."). 
101 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. A; cf. supra notes 63-71. 
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capped contingent fees at 50 percent.in their infancy, contingent fee 
percentages were often moderate and risk reflective, in the 5 to 25 
percent range.They quickly climbed to the 50 percent level and 
higher, and later receded somewhat in the face of severe criticism by the 
public and other lawyers. 
When percentages remained unreasonably high—in the 50 percent 
range—states and courts, through statutes and rules, drove the rates 
down to a 25 to 50 percent level.These statutes and rules were 
102 See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 30 n.l. 
103 See Wylie v. Coxa, 56 U.S. 415 (1853) (the first Supreme Court opinion to approve a 
eontingent fee; though there was considerable risk, the contingent percentage was 5 percent). In 
Wright V. Tebbitts, 91 U.S. 252 (1875), in which there was also considerable risk, the contingent 
percentage was 10 percent. In Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876), the Court noted that the 
usual contingent fee was 20-25 percent, see id. at 549, though in the matter before it, the fee was 
5 percent. See id. at 556. In a will contest fraught with imcertainty, the contingent fee was 5 
percent. See Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195 (1878) (plaintiff lawyer testified that the usual 
contingent fee for collection suits was 5 percent). In a personal injury action against a railroad, 
the contingent fee was 20 percent. See Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb. 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1856). 
Higher percentages were also charged. See, e.g.. Bayard v. McLane, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 139 (1840) 
(66 percent). 
194 Report of Committee on Contingent Fee, in 1907 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
121; ANN. REP. OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DESIRABILITY OF JUDICIAL REGULATION OF 
CONTINGENT FEES FOR 1937-38 TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
294(1938): 
[T]he amount of the contingent fee ... has become in the large majority of eases ... 50 
percent of the recovery .... For the first two or three decades after the legalization of 
the contingent fee, percentages were moderate, [sic] fifteen per cent, or twenty per 
cent, of the recovery was considered reasonable. This has grown until forty per cent is 
common, fifty per cent is not unusual, and sixty per cent has been known to have been 
charged. 
Id. 
19^ Typically, these rules and statutes established sliding scales applying the largest 
percentages to the initial amounts of recovery and smaller percentages to additional increments; 
some simply set a maximum percentage. New York's rule essentially limiting contingent fees in 
personal injury cases to one-third was first promulgated by the Appellate Division after attempts 
to enaet legislation were blocked by lawyer legislators. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.7 (e) 
(McKinney 2002); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, cert denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960) (upholding the 
appellate division's fee-limiting rule as within the power of the court). In opposing a legislative 
effort by lawyers to overrule judieially imposed restrictions on contingent fee percentages, the 
New York Herald Tribune editorialized in 1960: "[T]he First Department... found that njost of 
the lawyers in 150,000 contingency fees eases eaeh year were hauling down 50 percent of 
amounts recovered for themselves. This, incidentally, seems to be pretty much the national 
picture." N.Y. HERALD TRIE., Mar. 23, 1960, quoted in Note, A Study of Contingent Fees in the 
Prosecution of Personal Injury Claims, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 197, 203 (1966). 
For other states' rules and statutes limiting eontingent fees, see, for example., CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (2002) ("MICRA") (limiting contingent fees in medieal malpractice 
actions to 40 percent of the first $50,000, recovered, 33 pereent of the next $50,000, 25 percent of 
the next $500,000, and 15 pereent of any amount of recovery over $600,000); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 52-25Ic (b)(2001) (limiting contingent fees in personal injury, wrongful death or damage to 
property claims to 33 percent of the first $300,000, 25 percent of the next $300,000, 20 percent of 
the next $300,000, 15 percent of the next $300,000 and 10 percent of any amount exceeding 
$1,200,000); FLA. STAT. eh. 73.092 (2002) (capping contingent fees in eminent domain 
proceedings to 33 percent of any benefit up to $250,000 25 percent of the benefit between 
$250,000 and $1,000,000, and 20 pereent of any benefit exceeding $1,000,000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
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themselves predicated on the conclusion that fee percentages were too 
high and were unresponsive to competitive forces.'"^ Had regulatory 
regimes not intervened to cap contingency fees at 50 percent or lower, 
the standard contingent fee would, in my judgment, likely have risen to 
the 60 to 75 percent range. The available historical evidence is to the 
effect that the regulatorily induced one-third (and higher) standard rate 
is essentially a political rather than a market-driven determination and 
represents a balance of power between the various relevant actors. To 
argue that it is also an equilibrium price which is the result of 
competitively derived forces not only ignores its historical derivation 
but also accepts that by the sheerest of coincidences, the one-third fee 
also represents a competitively derived rate of return. 
III. FACTORS WHICH INHIBIT EMERGENCE OF A PRICE COMPETITIVE 
MARKET: MARKET FAILURES 
A. Asymmetrical Information 
In order for a competitive market to exist, consumers must be 
i n f o r m e d  o f  t h e  p r i c e s  b e i n g  c h a r g e d  b y  s e r v i c e  p r o v i d e r s . T h i s  
information must be easily available in terms which are meaningful to 
consumers; that is, the units in which the prices are stated must convey 
sufficient information to enable consumers to make price comparisons. 
In addition, consumers must be able to determine the relative quality 
levels of the service providers vying for their business so that they can 
make informed price/quality tradeoffs in selecting a provider.'®^ In fact, 
however, consumers of contingency fee tort claiming services lack such 
essential knowledge and experience in dealing with lawyer-providers 
and are therefore disadvantaged in bargaining with such lawyer-
providers for services. 
5 § 7 (2003) (limiting contingent fees to 50 percent of the net recovery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-
26-120 (2002) (limiting contingent fees in medical malpractice cases to 33 percent of all damages 
awarded); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.221 (Vemon 2002) (limiting contingent fees in workers 
compensation cases to 25 percent of the plaintiffs' recovery); WIS. STAT. § 655.013 (1986) 
(limiting contingent fees in medical malpractice cases to 33 percent or 25 percent of the first $1 
million depending on whether the liability is stipulated within a statutory deadline, and 20 pereent 
of any amount over $1 million); WIS. STAT. § 102.26(2) (1993) (limiting contingent fees in 
workers compensation cases to 20 percent of disputed benefits). In social security cases, fees are 
typically limited to no more than 25 percent of back benefits up to a maximum of $4,000. See 42 
U.S.C. § 406(a)(2) (2003). 
106 See supra no^A5. 
107 See supra text accompanying note 46. 
108 Sgg ggnerally James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The 
Role of Asymmetric Information In Attorney Compensation, 9 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993). 
109 See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Lit., 129 B.R. 710, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) 
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1. Consumers Lack Knowledge Of The Value Of Tort Claims 
In the market for tort claiming services, awareness of price requires 
knowledge of the value of claims. This is so because while consumers 
are purchasing a service from the lawyer, they are paying for the service 
by exchanging a share of their claims. The reasonableness of the price 
of the service is therefore a function of the value of the claim being 
exchanged which is itself a function of the risk being undertaken by the 
lawyer. However, many tort claimants do not know whether they have 
a compensable claim and most have little knowledge of the value of 
their claims, or of the risk the lawyer is assuming in purchasing a share 
of their claims.'That risk is itself a function of litigation risk and 
what the lawyer projects placing at risk: the amount of time the lawyer 
anticipates will be required to produce an adequate recovery and the 
litigation costs that he will have to advance. Tort lawyers, on the other 
hand, are experts in the valuation of claims and the risk involved, the 
estimated time to be required and the amount of funds that they will 
need to advance. This advantage redounds to the lawyer's benefit and 
disadvantages the consumer with regard to bargaining over the price of 
the service.'" If risk and anticipated effort is so low that charging a 
standard contingency fee will likely lead to a windfall for the lawyer, he 
does not, as a matter of praetice, share that information with the client 
as for example, when the lawyer reasonably anticipates that, because of 
the severity of the injury and the clear culpability of the alleged 
tortfeasor, he will be able to obtain a substantial settlement offer 
approaching policy limits after only 10-20 hours of work, generating a 
("Contingent fee clients are often unsophisticated and infrequent consumers who may not be in a 
financial position to pursue an alternative [fee] arrangement."). The extent of the information 
asymmetry is suggested by the American Bar Fovmdation's finding that 80 percent of persons 
polled "cannot identify which particular lawyer is competent to handle their particular problem.' 
Peter H. Schuck, Consumer Ignorance in the Area of Legal Services, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 568, 568 
(1976). See also Stephen Cillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee 
Agreements With Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581, 584 (1997) (asserting that "the number 
of unsophisticated clients who retain lawyers is probably greater than the number of sophisticated 
clients who do so" and that "in any one year, more lawyers probably have more unsophisticated 
clients than they have sophisticated ones"). "Surely, at a minimum, hundreds of thousands of 
unsophisticated clients hire tens of thousands of lawyers yearly." Id. Moreover, the recently 
adopted RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 3 (2000) fails to protect 
unsophisticated clients from being easy pickings for lawyers. 
119 See Kritzer, Seven Myths supra note 1, at 778. 
I l l  S e e  Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 56, 66, 68-71; see also Dana & Spier 
supra note 108 (examining the use of contingent fees when the lawyer has better information than 
the client about the quality of the client's case); Winand Emons, Expertise, Contingent Fees, and 
Insufficient Attorney Effort, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON 21, 21-23 (acknowledging the difference in 
knowledge and understanding between attorneys and clients and recognizing that clients must 
rely on attorneys as experts). 
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windfall fee amounting to thousands of dollars an hour."^ if the client 
questions whether the fee is justified in light of the size or clarity of the 
claim, the lawyer can use his superior knowledge to fend off the attempt 
to bargain over the fee, for example, by exaggerating risk in order to 
justify the high price implicit in the standard contingent fee.^'^ 
2. Consumers Lack Other Meaningful Price Information 
At first blush, it seems incongruous to argue that claimants lack 
knowledge of the price of lawyers' services when contingent fees are 
standard. However, knowing that the lawyer is charging one third or 40 
percent of the value of a claim as realized, does not yield the kind of 
meaningful information that is needed for the operation of a competitive 
market. In order to make price comparisons, many consumers who 
purchase services effectively translate the cost of those services into a 
rough hourly rate equivalent. The sign above the auto mechanic's 
workshop that he charges $90 an hour for his time conveys meaningful 
(but incomplete) information. The doctor who charges $100 for an 
office visit is charging somewhere in the range of $400-$600 an hour 
plus additional fixed fees for specific services such as x-rays, lab work, 
etc. Similar calculations can be made for the plumber or the school 
teacher. Consumers of tort claiming services, however, have no basis 
upon which to estimate the effective hourly rate that the lawyer 
anticipates receiving since this requires estimates of the value of the 
claim and the amount of time to be required to produce an acceptable 
settlement or to take the case to trial. Here too, it is in lawyers' self-
•12 SEE DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE 
PAID AND HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA 140 (1993). There is little bargaining over the terms of the 
contingent fee. Most plaintiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is the 
lawyer who will inform them (and agree to a lower percentage of the take) when they happen to 
have an extremely high probability of wirming. In most instances, therefore, the contingent fee is 
a standard rate that seldom varies with the size of a likely settlement or the odds of prevailing in 
coiuf. 
•'2 See, e.g., In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 88 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Rohan v. Rosenblatt, CV 
930116887S, 1999 LEXIS 2231 (Corm. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1999) (attorney's representation that 
suit would be necessary to collect the proceeds of a $100,000 life insurance policy on client's 
decreased wife "had no factual basis;" therefore, former client prevailed in suit to recover 
$33,333.33 fee paid); Robinson v. Sharp, 201 111. 86, 92 (1903) (finding that lawyer aroused 
"serious [mis]apprehensions"); In re St. John, 43 A.D.2d 218, (1974); Haight v. Moore, 37 N.Y. 
Super. (5 Jones & Spencer) 161, 165-66 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1874); Ransom v. Ransom, 70 Misc. 30, 
41-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910), rev'd, 147 A.D. 835 (1911); Kickland v. Egan, 36 S.D. 428 (1915); 
Nugent V. Moody, 271 S.W. 266 (Tex. 1925); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E. 
2d  107 ,  114  (W .  V a .  1986 )  ( l awye r s  "mi s r ep re sen t ed  t he  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  ob t a i n i ng  t h e . . .  
proceeds"); cf. United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 
1102 (1981); Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. Va. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Iowa 1980); 
Renegar v. Staples, 388 P.2d 867 (Okla. 1963). See also Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 
19, at 65; Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.l3; infra note 123. 
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interest not to make such disclosures since that might induce clients to 
seek to bargain for lower fees.''^ A lawyer quoting a fee of one third 
may be stating that he intends to charge a substantially different 
effective hourly rate than another lawyer who is also quoting a one third 
fee. 
Moreover, even after a settlement has been reached, tort claimants 
attempting to Icam how many hours the attorney devoted to their matter 
arc almost always rebuffed.Thus, a typical tort claimant agreeing to 
pay a lawyer a standard one third fee has no idea, ex ante, of the amount 
of the fee he is agreeing to pay, let alone of the effective hourly rate that 
the lawyer is charging, and does not know the effective hourly rate he 
actually paid, ex post." ̂  
The contingent-fee-paying consumer's substantial lack of 
knowledge of the effective hourly rate that he is agreeing to pay to the 
lawyer further inhibits the operation of a competitive market. 
3. Consumers Lack Knowledge Of The Quality Of Lawyering 
Services 
In addition to lacking knowledge of the value of their claims and 
the anticipated effective hourly rates that the client is agreeing to pay, 
clients lack knowledge that would enable them to assess the quality of 
the lawyering services that they are contracting to hire.'^'^ When 
114 See supra note 112. It is also not in contingent fee lawyers' self-interest to disclose 
information about fees that would enable the public to determine their effective hourly rates of 
return or actual incomes. For consideration of the "stealth" function of contingent fees, see 
Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. C. 
115 I am basing this conclusion in part on anecdotal data I have acquired of the type referred to 
in Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.l3. Tort claimants who have called me 
for advice in cases where they believe that the lawyer devoted very few hours to generate a very 
substantial settlement, almost always indicate that they are rebuffed when they ask their lawyers 
how much time the lawyer devoted to the matter. One standard answer they get from their 
lawyers is: 1 don't keep time records. Persistence may generate a more detailed answer, such as; 
I devoted substantial time to the matter. Id. Further persistence sometimes results in threats by 
the lawyer to sue the client if he does not agree to endorse the settlement check so the lawyer can 
deposit the funds into his trust account and then withdraw his fee. 
116 For discussion of the stealthiness of contingent fees, see Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, 
iupra note 1, app. C. 
112 The bar implicitly recognized the importance of such knowledge in creating a pnce 
competitive environment by using its power to regulate the practice of law to disable consumers 
from assembling a directory that would have constituted a step in that direction. See Supreme 
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (holding 
that Virginia Disciplinary Rules (D.R.) 2-102 (A)(6) of the Virginia Code of Professional 
Responsibility unconstitutionally inhibited the gathering of information incMent to the 
publication of a legal services directory designed to assist consumers in making informed 
decisions concerning selection of a lawyer). It is interesting to note that after prevailing in this 
matter. Consumer Union did not thereafter proceed with its plans to gather information and 
publish the directory. 
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consumers lack information needed to. compare lawyers qualitatively, 
they are unable to exercise the kinds of choices that consumers regular y 
make in price competitive markets.>i« m addition, consumers inability 
to distinguish among lawyers qualitatively inhibits 
offering lower prices and consumers from choosing lower priced tort 
claiming services—a subject which will be further explored later m th 
B. Prohibitive Search Costs 
The effect of these great imbalances between claimants 
knowledge levels and that of tort lawyers is to tilt the fee bargain 
playing field decidedly in the direction of the lawyer. A claiman 
Leking to overcome the asymmetrical information burden faces a 
daunting task. As noted, tort lawyers do not engage in price advertising 
let alone competitive price advertising.^'^ ^ 
market quickly learn, if they did not already know, that viitoally a 
lawyers charge the same contingent fee percentage. The signal is clear. 
aSts to obtain lower prices are simply rebuffed. Magmlymg the 
search cost is the fact that most tort claimants are 
motivation to develop expertise. ). 
resolve the case is always negotiable. Sometimes you can negotiate a sliding scale fee 
(for example, 30 percent of any recovery up to $10,000; 20 percent of any 
to $50,000, etc.) Remember that there's no particular percentage of a consumer 
recover that constitutes a "standard" or "official" fee. 
The ^ze of the contingency fee should reflect the amount of work that will be 
re^fred Vflie attorney Some cases are straightforward; others can be novel or 
urertl You may want to ask whether the case is likely to settle quickly and 
whether government agencies will gather significant amounts of evidence. A fe 
RI=R.C.SRSIR."';I -
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amass information about the value of their claims, the amount of time a 
lawyer would reasonably anticipate being required and the quality of the 
lawyers being considered, the substantial cost of doing so would have to 
be justified by the savings to be realized. Any rational assessment, 
therefore, has to take into account that even when armed with this 
information, claimants may still not be able to induce lawyers to bargain 
over fees. Thus, for the one-time purchaser of tort claiming services 
who cannot amortize costs over a series of cases, standard pricing may 
raise search costs from daunting to prohibitive. 
Search costs are further magnified by the unique efficacy of 
standard contingency fees in conveying deceptive information with 
regard to risk. To be sure, many tort claims involve considerable risk 
and insufficient reward. Attorneys, however, carefully screen these 
claims and reject a large portion, included most denominated as high 
risk.However, many claims involve little risk and relatively high 
reward, generating windfall fees that can amount to thousands of dollars 
an hour.'22 Jq justify their substantial fees in these cases, contingency 
fee lawyers may, in the low visibility confines of their offices, 
deliberately exaggerate the risk they are undertaking in these cases. 
As an alternative to such expressly deceptive behavior, tort 
lawyers, by collectively maintaining a standard rate, can announce to all 
adhesion'"); see also Gisbrecht v. Bamhart; 533 U.S. 789, 812 (2002) (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
("[I]t is uncontested that the specialized Social Security bar charges uniform contingent fees ... 
which are presumably presented to the typically imsophisticated client on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis."); Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 422 ("[A] standardized form contract prepared by ... [the attorney 
who] would have declined to represent... [the client] if he had not entered into the contingent 
fee agreement. .. ."); Silver, Civil Justice, supra note 38, at 2088 ("[U]nsophisticated lay-persons 
cannot shop for legal services intelligently."); supra note 109. 
121 See supra note 65. 
122 See supra notes 22-23. 
123 See supra note 111. Exaggeration of risk to justify charging a substantial contingent fee 
may be endemic to contingent fee financing of tort claims. In England, a modest version of the 
contingent fee, called a conditional fee, has been instituted. See Colleen P. Graffy, Conditional 
Fees: Key to The Courthouse or the Casino, 1 LEGAL ETHICS 70, 70-72, 79-83 (1998) 
(summarizing the history of the adoption of conditional fees). Under the conditional fee system, 
a lawyer can contract with a personal injury claimant to "uplift" the fee by up to 100% in 
exchange for undertaking the risk of decreasing the fee by a like percentage in the event the 
litigation fails. The uplift is supposed to reflect the degree of risk being assumed. This creates an 
opportunity for English solicitors to exaggerate the litigation risk, thereby mulcting clients by 
offering substantial uplifts in cases in which there is little or modest risk. According to an official 
report, that is precisely what is occurring; 
The proportion of conditional fee cases with low estimated chances of success is 
surprising and raises questions about the way in which solicitors are assessing risk. 
This could cast a doubt over the fairness of the entire scheme... [T]he inconsistency in 
the uplift applied to cases with similar chances of success is worrying. The uplift 
appears to be either too low or (more often) too high, in almost half the cases... [A] 
cynical interpretation is that some solicitors might be deliberately over estimating risk 
to justify charging clients a higher uplift. 
Report to the Lord Chancellor by Sir Peter Middleton, GCB, Review of Civil Justice and Legal 
Aid, Sept. 1997, at xii-xiii, xvii-xviii, as quoted in Graffy, supra, at 85. 
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claimants that they are simply charging the standard fee that prevails in 
the commimity. In addition by maintaining a substantial standard 
contingent fee percentage ranging from one third to 50 percent, they 
also signal to potential tort claimants that all contingency fee financed 
litigation is high risk. If the case involves high risk and insufficient 
reward, the lawyer simply declines to take the case. If it will generate a 
substantial effective hourly rate, the lawyer presents the claimant with 
his standard contingent fee agreement form. If the client believes, 
however correctly, that his claim presents a low or nonexistent risk and 
therefore seeks a lower percentage fee, the lawyer insists on the 
standard rate because it is the standard rate. Because all lawyers 
charge the same rate, it is necessarily "fair" and comparison shopping is 
therefore unnecessary. 
C. The Signaling Function of Standard Pricing 
The evidence so far considered most supports the conclusion that 
contingency fee lawyers maintain uniform pricing because at the levels 
charged, one third to 50 percent, substantial rents are levied. It is 
reasonable to conclude that lawyers maintain a uniform pricing structure 
because they perceive that it is in their self-interest to do so and not 
deviate, even infrequently, from the standard fee. A law firm 
considering whether to undercut the standard price would recognize that 
if it successfully did so, other firms would also lower their prices and 
that, as a consequence, both aggregate and individual income would 
fall.'25 This recognition provides a strong incentive for acting 
collusively to maintain a imiform price. 
By "collusive," I do not mean that lawyers meet together, 
clandestinely or otherwise, to agree on a uniform price. Rather, I mean 
that lawyers act in the same manner as do gas stations owners on 
adjacent comers who recognize that if any of them lower the price, the 
others will respond by lowering their prices. The ensuring "gas war" 
will lead to lower profits for all of the adjacent owners. To avoid such 
mutually destructive behavior, adjacent gas station owners consciously 
collude with each other by maintaining at least near price uniformity. 
Lawyers maintain a uniform price for the same reason; that is, it 
maximizes revenue and also because it yields considerable rents. 
124 See Vonde M. Smith Hitch, Ethics and the Reasonableness of Contingency Fees: A Survey 
of State and Federal Law Addressing the Reasonableness of Costs as They Relate to Contingency 
Fee Arrangements, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 215, 245 (1994) ("Often clients accept whatever 
rate an attorney suggests merely because it seems to be the 'going rate,' and thus they do not 
realize that they are being overcharged."). 
125 Cf Phillips & Butler, supra note 60. 
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Moreover, price collusion is aided by control over the practice of law 
which courts have reposed in themselvesand by use of that control to 
prohibit competitive behavior.'^7 
The argument that lawyers are acting collusively to fix the price of 
tort claiming is open to a number of objections. A collusive pricing 
system maintained by a few gas station owners is easily policed. Prices 
are posted and deviations are instantly identified. Thousands of lawyers 
operating in the low visibility confines of their offices cannot be nearly 
so sanguine that other players are maintaining the standard price. 
Indeed, economists would predict that some lawyers would deviate 
from cooperating with other contingent fee lawyers to maximize joint 
profits by charging less than the standard price, expecting to increase 
t h e  v o l u m e  o f  s a l e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  g e n e r a t e  h i g h e r  p r o f i t s . I n  
addition, lawyers who operate more efficiently or who are more 
competent and therefore are able to obtain higher settlements, would 
also bid prices down, driving out less efficient and less competent 
lawyers. That contingent fee lawyers do not deviate fi-om standard 
contingent fee pricing is therefore, under standard economic theory, an 
indication that the standard price is some form of competitive market-
derived equilibrium price.In that market, lawyers who charged less 
would not be able to compensate for lower prices with sufficient 
increased volume to generate higher profits. However, as already noted, 
there is considerable evidence that the market for contingent fee 
financed tort claiming services is not competitive. Standard economic 
theory, however, which seeks to explain the operation of markets under 
'26 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.3 (1986); Charles W. 
Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (1989). 
127 See infra section VI. In addition to the structural impediments and ethical restrictions 
discussed infra which inhibit price competitive behavior, tort lawyers may also be reluctant to 
deviate from standard pricing out of concern that they will be ostracized by fellow tort lawyers. 
In addition to per group approval concerns, lawyers may also fear that courts and disciplinary 
bodies would not look kindly on such fee "cheating" and would use their discretionary authority 
to punish them in more tangible ways. 
128 According to economic theory, in the standard supply-demand curve, the demand curve 
slopes from left to right, that is, the lower the price, the higher the quantity demanded. See BEGG 
ET AL., ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 35. Contingent fee lawyers, like oligopolists are "tom 
between the desire to collude, thus maximizing joint profits, and the desire to compete, in the 
hope of increasing market share and profits at the expense of rivals." Id. at 162. If one member-
firm increases output by undercutting the standard price, consumers will substitute its services for 
those of the firms maintaining the (higher) standard price. This increase in demand will yield a 
rise in the price-cutting firm's profits at the expense of those maintaining the standard price, thus 
creating a strong incentive to stray from the tacit agreement. See id. 
129 Equilibrium price is the price at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. 
When price lies above this equilibrium, sellers must decrease the price in order to increase 
demand, thereby enabling sale of a quantity for which profits cover output costs. Likewise, when 
price lies below the equilibrium, demand exceeds supply and sellers are able to increase price 
until the equilibrium price is reached. See BEGG ET AL., ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 32-34. 
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ideal conditions, may not therefore adequately account for the 
maintenance of uniform contingent fee pricing. Because deviations 
from expected competitive behavior appear to be the norm and not the 
exception, we need to look beyond standard economic theory to explain 
an apparent market failure. 
1. Price Cutting Signals A Shirking Or Inferior Quality Lawyer 
The lack of knowledge of most consumers of tort claiming services 
of the value of their claims places claimants at a distinct disadvantage in 
negotiating price with contingent fee lawyers. Claimants are also 
disadvantaged because they caimot effectively monitor their lawyer's 
services, that is, they have no realistic way of determining whether their 
lawyer is shirking or otherwise acting self-interestedly in negotiating a 
settlement. 
These attributes of contingency fee claiming create a significant 
bias in favor of maintaining standard pricing. A price cutter may indeed 
be offering the same quality of service as other providers charging 
standard contingent fees. But a price cutter may also be signaling that 
she intends to devote fewer resources to prosecution of the claim than 
price maintainers. As a consequence, a lower settlement may be 
secured which yields a lower net payment to the client. When the client 
is neither able to determine the competence level of the lawyer he 
selects nor to verify the level of his lawyer's efforts, a rational response 
is to shun price cutters and to instead pay the standard contingent fee.'^" 
A related reason why lawyers who may wish to undercut the 
standard rate are deterred from doing so is because clients would likely 
perceive a cut rate price offer as signaling that the lawyer is inferior in 
quality to price maintainers. Since the client cannot monitor the 
lawyer's efforts to assure at least a reasonable quality of effort, the 
decision whether to hire that lawyer may entail substantial risk. As with 
a shirking lawyer, an inferior lawyer may gain a lower settlement, 
generating a lower net payment to the client than a lawyer charging the 
130 See Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard and Attorney 
Rents, 44 J. L. & ECON. 549, 550 (2001) [hereinafter Santore & Viard]: 
When attorney effort is not verifiable, contingent fees serve a dual role: in addition to 
compensating the attorney, contingent fees also provide the incentive for the attorney 
to put forth effort. Since attorneys put forth less effort at lower contingent fees, clients 
may prefer a higher contingent fee to the one that yields zero profits. Clients are 
unwilling to hire an attomey who offers a lower contingent fee, because doing so 
would reduce their net recovery—^the lower level of attomey effort induced by the 
contingent fee would reduce the recovery by enough to outweigh the client's larger 
share of the recovery. As a result, attomeys cannot undercut this equilibrium by 
offering a lower contingent fee. 
Id. 
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more expensive standard rate. 
D. A Comparative Analysis of Factors Affecting Pricing Of Real 
Estate Brokerage and Tort Claiming Services 
In summary, the market failures that account for the persistence of 
standard pricing for tort claiming services include: asymmetric 
information with regard to the value of tort claims, litigation risk, and 
the amounts of time required for prosecution of a claim; lack of 
meaningful price information; prohibitive search costs encountered by 
claimants seeking to make price and quality comparisons including the 
discouraging effect of those costs on consumers considering whether to 
expend resources to comparison shop; the unique efficacy of uniform 
pricing in misleadingly informing claimants that all cases are high risk; 
and the signaling effect of uniform pricing in deterring lawyers from 
competing on a price basis by deviating from standard pricing and 
further deterring claimants from searching for price-cutting lawyers. 
The effects of these market failures may usefiilly be examined by a 
comparison of the markets for real estate brokerage and tort claiming 
services. 
At the outset, we can note that home owners seeking to hire real 
estate brokers and tort claimants seeking to hire a lawyer face vastly 
different search costs to acquire information about the price of the 
131 Additional explanations exist for the persistence of uniform contingent fee rates. 
According to one such explanation, contingency fee lawyers may be aided in acting in a 
coordinated fashion to maintain standard contingency fee pricing by inertial social forces. "Path 
dependence," an economic theory, postulates that some remediably inefficient social systems 
persist because of information and public choice costs. See Stephen E. Margolis and S.J. 
Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 17, 19 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). However, the empirical evidence advanced in support of 
this theory is weak. Id. at 21-22. See also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The 
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 LOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). 
Another explanation is based on a theory that law has an "expressive" function, that is, "that law 
influences behavior independent of the sanctions it threatens to impose[,]" by providing "a focal 
point around which individuals can coordinate their behavior." Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-51 (2000). This theory may help to 
explain the persistence of standard contingency fee pricing. In a number of states, maximum 
contingency fees, usually one third, are set by statute or court rule. See ROBERT L. ROSSI, 
ATTORNEY S FEES § 2:10, 114-20 (2d ed. 1995). Since there is standard pricing, that maximum 
fee is also, in reality, the minimum fee. Thus, the legal expression of a maximum fee "provide[s] 
a focal point for coordinating individual action," by contingency fee lawyers; that is, it signals to 
lawyers that by acting in a coordinated fashion, they can maintain the maximum fee as the 
standard fee. McAdams, supra 1666. "[T]he state ean focus attention on one of several 
equilibrium solutions to a coordination game by commanding or merely recommending that 
individuals coordinate around that solution." Id. at 1663. "Each [lawyer] selects the salient 
strategy [of uniform contingent fee pricing] because they expect the other[s] to do the same and 
each has an interest in doing what the other[s] do." Id. at 1668. 
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services to be purchased. Most home owners have an at least 
approximate idea of the value of their homes; moreover, they caii 
relatively easily acquire knowledge about value by consulting other real 
estate brokers, neighbors, listings of properties sold and recent 
appraisals done as part of refinancing mortgages. In addition, home 
owners can roughly approximate the amount of time 
likely have to devote to the task of selling their home.'^^ Thus, home 
owners have a reasonable basis for estimating in advance the actual 
price in dollars that they are effectively agreeing to pay to brokers and 
can roughly approximate the hourly rates they are agreeing to pay, as 
well. An agreement to pay a commission of 6 percent of the sale pnce 
may therefore be seen as the substantial equivalent of an agreement to 
nav a fixed price for a reasonably quantifiable service contingent upon a 
sale Home owners are therefore not being misled by the use of uniform 
pricing in brokerage services. They know the approximate price they 
are paying in advance of contracting for the service and are therefore 
able to make an informed determination whether to use the services of a 
full priced broker, a discount broker or, in the alternative, rely on their 
own efforts to sell their home. For these and other reasons, the marke 
for real estate brokerage services is becoming increasingly 
^The situation is dramatically different for tort claimants. As noted, 
most tort claimants do not know whether they have a compensable 
claim, let alone the value of their inquiry. They must rely almost 
exclusively on the expert claim evaluator: the tort lawyer. In addition, 
they lack information about the amount of work that the la^er 
reasonably anticipates that she will have to do to secure an acceptable 
settlement offer or to take the case to trial. Moreover, the la^er has a 
clear incentive to exaggerate risk and overstate the amount of^time to be 
required A typical tort claimant agreeing to pay a standard one third 
fee neither knows the amount of the fee or the effective hourty rate he is 
agreeing to pay ex ante nor the effective hourly rate that he has paid, ex 
^^^^ The pricing in the respective markets that the two service 
purchasers are entering also differs because of critical differences in the 
nature of the services being purchased; in particular, qualitative 
differences in skill levels and quantitative differences in the range o 
each of the respective services. Sale of a home may take only weeks or 
may require many months. Even so, the range of effort expended by 
real estate brokers in selling a home varies considerably less than does 
132 The more expensive the home, the greater the likely effort the ^rokerjnay be expected 
make but this is presumably compensated for by the higher commission resulting from the higher 
sale price. 
133 See supra notes 83-87. 
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the range of effort that a contingency fee lawyer may expend. The latter 
may range from a quick settlement requiring ten hours to a protracted 
settlement requiring fifty hours or more to a simple or complex jury trial 
requiring 100-500 hours or more. Thus, a home owner, having some 
reasonable basis for estimating the level of effort to be expended by the 
broker, can make a reasonably informed decision with regard to the 
price he is agreeing to pay to the broker. The tort claimant, however, 
for reasons already listed, is unaware of how much he is agreeing to pay 
the lawyer, how much effort the lawyer expects to devote to the matter, 
the value of the claim that he is selling to the lawyer in exchange for the 
service, and whether he is being mulcted by the lawyer by agreeing to 
pay—as he must—a standard contingent fee of one third or more in a 
case where risk may be slight and reward per unit of time may be great. 
Since the reasonably informed home owner knows more or less 
what degree of effort he is purchasing and the price he is paying 
whereas the typical tort claimant does not, there are considerable 
differences with regard to the respective opportunities for bargaining 
out from the standard charge. For example, a home owner can decide to 
hire a standard priced broker, or attempt to sell the property on her own 
or hire a broker willing to work for a discounted fee of 2 to 5 percent. If 
she does the latter, she exposes herself to at most only moderate 
damage. If the broker can only produce buyers willing to pay a price 
less than that sought by the home owner, the latter can fire the broker 
and hire a higher priced one. The loss is substantially limited to the 
value of the delay in selling the home. The limited downside as well as 
the greater knowledge about the value and actual price of the services 
that they are purchasing provides support for the decision of some home 
owners to seek out brokers willing to discount fees. 
The contrast with the tort claiming market is palpable. In addition 
to knowledge level differences, the tort claimant faces a significantly 
increased risk in choosing lawyer. Because the service is more 
complex, it is harder to judge the quality of the lawyer and harder to 
monitor what the lawyer is doing. As previously discussed, a lawyer 
may decide to maximize her effective hourly rate by devoting less time 
to the representation than required to obtain a substantial percentage of 
the maximum settlement value of the claim, or seek a quick settlement 
offer well below the maximum settlement value and then induce the 
client to accept it by, for example, portraying it as the best obtainable 
offer given unfavorable developments in the case of which the lawyer 
was unaware when she accepted the ease.'^"^ In the alternative, a lawyer 
may simply be inferior in quality because of inexperience or 
incompetence and therefore lose the case at trial or generate a settlement 
See Brickman, Money Talks, supra note 23, at 283-87 nn. 128-48. 
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offer that is substantially less than the maximum settlement value of the 
claim. Since most claimants cannot monitor their lawyers' performance 
and cannot evaluate the quality of the lawyer, the choice of a tort lawyer 
is more potentially impactuous than the choice of a real estate broker. 
Moreover, there is a res judicata effect when the lawyer is hired. If the 
client loses, he cannot then go back and hire a better lawyer. In the case 
of the substandard settlement offer, some clients do then terminate their 
lawyers and obtain new counsel but the costs are substantial and few are 
willing to persevere to that extent. 
Under these circumstances, the tort claimant, unlike the home 
owner, may be reluctant to seek out a lawyer willing to charge a lower 
contingent fee than the one standard in that community for fear that 
such a lawyer is signaling that he will shirk or that he is of inferior 
quality. 
The differences in search costs for the home owner seeking to hire 
a real estate broker and the tort claimant seeking to hire a contingent fee 
lawyer are thus substantial. These differences account, in part, for the 
substantial differences in the pricing of the respective services. The real 
estate brokerage market is increasingly price competitive. Standard 
pricing persists, however, in the tort claiming market. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE FEE-SETTING MECHANISMS THAT WOULD BE 
EXPECTED TO OVERCOME THE PERSISTENCE OF UNIFORM PRICING AND 
INDUCE PRICE COMPETITION 
Even though the market failures previously addressed account in 
some measure for the lack of price competition, they are insufficient to 
explain the persistence and pervasiveness of uniform contingent fee 
pricing. Absent additional factors, we would expect some lawyers to 
compete on the basis of price in the tort claiming market and advertise 
that they charge below market rates. In addition, we would expect a 
variety of other market-based solutions to be devised that would lead to 
price competition. In this section, I list a variety of ways in which price 
competitive behavior may be anticipated to arise and in succeeding 
sections, I consider why those projected solutions have not come to 
pass. 
Perhaps the most obvious, though least utilitarian, alternative 
pricing mechanism that would induce price competition would be for 
lawyers to offer to charge noncontingent hourly fees or fixed fees 
instead of contingent fees. Indeed, ethics rulings have mandated that 
135 For discussion of how the fee is set when the client terminates a contingent fee lawyer, see 
generally Brickman, Setting the Fee, supra note 66. 
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contingent fee lawyers offer claimants just such alternative fee 
structures.It is highly likely that, in such circumstances, tort lawyers 
would charge differential hourly rates, thus competing on a price basis. 
This solution fails, however, for three reasons. First, even though so 
mandated, tort lawyers honor that ethical requirement only in its 
breach.'37 Indeed, the fact that tort lawyers violate an ethical obligation 
by refusing to offer to represent clients on bases other than contingent 
fees has been cited by the American Bar Association as a justification 
for jettisoning the requirement—which it has recently done.'^s 
Moreover, even if the requirement were to be reinstituted and enforced, 
most tort claimants could not afford to pay hourly rates or fixed fees and 
would therefore choose the contingent fee alternative. In addition, 
claimants who could afford to pay hourly rates would nonetheless be 
reluctant to choose that alternative because of their risk averseness and 
agency costs. Most tort claimants would have even less ability to 
monitor tort lawyers' efforts and the appropriateness of the hours 
claimed by lawyers to have been devoted to the task where lawyers are 
charging hourly rates as when eharging contingent fees. 
Other market-based alternative structures for the delivery of tort-
claiming services that may be expected to have arisen and that would be 
expected to result in lawyers competing, inter alia, by offering 
differential pricing, include: 
1) lawyers openly bidding against each other on the basis of 
price for the right to represent the claimant; 
2) lawyers purchasing tort claims in their entirety from claimants 
thereby eliminating all agency costs; 
3) lawyers promising that they will advance part of the anticipated 
recovery to clients upon being selected to represent them; 
4) lawyers agreeing to provide "financial assistance" to clients at 
the outset and during the pendency of claims; and 
5) lawyers and other entrepreneurs, claiming expertise in lawyer 
selection, offering to broker tort lawyers' services to claimants, 
including bargaining with tort lawyers over fees and expenses. 
With only one notable exception, these market-based alternative 
fee setting arrangements have not arisen. In the next section, I consider 
that notable exception—airline crash litigation—and in the succeeding 
section, why that notable exception has been limited to a tiny sliver of 
the tort-claiming market and why other market-based alternative fee 
setting arrangements which would be price competitive, have not come 
into use. 
'36 See Brickman, Assault on Fiduciary Protection, supra note 25, at text accompanying 
nn.106-21. 
'37 Id. at text accompanying n.l21. 
'38 Id. at nn. 144-47. 
2003] C O N T I N G E N T  F E E  T O R T  L I T I G A T I O N  107 
V. BIDDING FOR TORT CLAIMANTS: AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 
There is one notable exception to the empirically based conclusion 
that contingent fees are standard and range from one third to 50 percent, 
depending on the jurisdiction: aviation accident litigation. Here 
prevailing contingent fees are not standard but rather, in many cases, are 
unique to each crash depending upon risk factors and are substantially 
below the standard rate in all other tort litigation. An inquiry into this 
highly specialized aspect of tort claiming is therefore mandated.'^9 
Very few aviation accident cases are brought annually, on the order 
of approximately 200.The cases are very lucrative'^i and often 
involve little or no liability risk because airline companies or their 
insurers often concede liability and agree to settle the claims.''*^ 
Lawyers compete for these lucrative cases by openly soliciting 
claimants. For these reasons a handful of law firms have come to 
dominate aviation accident litigation.''*^ Many aviation accident claims. 
139 In addition to the sources cited in the footnotes in this section, I also rely on knowledge I 
have acquired during the course of my research from conversations with lawyers. I am especially 
compelled to rely on this personal knowledge with respect to fee information based on events 
occurring in the last decade because there is virtually no published literature describing airline 
litigation price setting practices after 1995. While trial lawyers are generally secretive about their 
effective homly rates, see Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. H, the level of 
secrecy I have encountered in seeking fee information on this subject far exceeds the already high 
level that prevails in tort claiming. See, e.g., Julie Kay, Sad Dilemma: A Year After Attacks, Most 
Victims and Their Families Remain Uncertain About Best Venue for Seeking Redress, MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 11, 2002, at A1 (reporting that "a veteran plaintiff lawyer" refused to 
disclose the contingent fee that he was charging families of 9/11 victims). 
140 See JAMES S. KAKALIK, E. KING, M. TRAYNOR, P. EBENER & L. PICUS, COSTS AND 
COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 88 (Rand, 1988) [hereinafter 
KAKALIK ET AL., AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION]. 
141 See Andrew Blum, The Aviation Bar Splits Over Turf, NAT'L L.J., March 20, 1989 at 1 
("settlement amounts are growing ... [t]he average award in the 1987 Northwest Airlines crash in 
Detroit is projected to be $1 million, a far cry from the $362,943 found in a 1988 RAND Corp. 
smdy "). In tort trial cases terminated by trial in U.S. district courts in 1996-97, of 41 such 
cases described as "personal injury - airplane," the median award was $937,000, far higher than 
the median for "product liability" cases. See Bulletin, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 1996-97, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Feb. 1999, at p. 5. Of the 16 plaintiff verdicts in "airplane" cases, 
43.8 percent were $1 million or more. Id. 
142 See KAKALIK ET AL., AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION, supra note 140, at 70-71 
("[Tjhere is virtually always someone who is liable for an aviation accident. ... Typically, the 
defendants either agree among themselves about how to divide expenditures for compensation 
and litigation, or they agree to let the outcome of one trial decide the division of liability."). See 
also Blum, supra note 141, at 1 ("[M]ost [aviation crash] suits are settled after the airline admits 
liability."). 
143 See ELIZABETH KING & JAMES P. SMITH, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOLLOWING AIRPLANE 
CRASHES 11 (Rand, 1988) ("small number of plaintiff attorneys have specialized in aviation 
accident cases"); KAKALIK ET AL.. AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION, supra note 140, at 41 
(fourteen plaintiffs' firms handled most of the sampled cases). For a list of the top lawyers and 
firms specializing in aviation law, see Who's Who In Aviation Law, NAT'L L.J., March 20, 1989, 
at 30. 
108 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
however, are solicited by lawyers who do not specialize in that field of 
litigation but who intend to sell the claims to one of the dominant firms 
in exchange for a referral fee.'"''' 
Before competition for these cases became the norm, standard 
contingent fees prevailed. Over the past thirty-five years, for reasons to 
be set out, contingent fees have declined steadily, averaging 
approximately 20 percent in the mid-1980s''^^ and declining somewhat 
further since then.^^^ 
One leading law firm establishes a price for each crash based upon 
its unique circumstances, including the number of passengers, the nature 
of the crash, the potential defendants, whether liability will be 
contested, and if it is, then the particular liability risk perceived; for a 
crash involving a significant number of victims where liability has been 
conceded, this law firm has charged rates of 12 to 14 percent, Other 
See, e.g., Charles Maher, Crashes & Disasters, 5 CALIF. LAW 39, 41 (1985) (quoting an 
aviation lawyer that "solicitation by unqualified lawyers has become commonplace"); Kakalik, et 
at, Aviation Aecident Litigation, supra note 140, at 46: 
Many of the claims handled by plaintiff aviation litigation specialists are referred to 
them by other attorneys. Frequently the referring attorney is the family lawyer or a 
friend of the decedent or the decedent's relatives or has some preexisting business or 
professional or personal relationship with them 
Sometimes the referring attorney has no preexisting relationship with the 
decedent or the claimants, but through advertising, publicity, or some other means has 
obtained several cases and wishes to refer them to an aviation specialist or involve such 
a specialist at some point. In this instance, the referring attorney usually insists on a 
portion of the total fee and may negotiate with one or more specialists to obtain the 
most profitable arrangement. Aviation specialists reported demands by such attomeys 
for as much as one-half the total fee. 
Id . 
See Maher, supra note 144, at 40 (1985) ([CJontingency fees "have dropped in 10 years 
Ifom 35 percent to about 15 to 20 percent, mainly beeause of the [Tenerife] letter and approaches 
taken to make prompt compensation."); Andrew Blum, Air Crash Death Average: $ 362,943, 
NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1988 (noting that in a Rand Corporation study from 1970 to 1984, claimants' 
attomey fees in 950 cases in which they were available averaged 21.5 percent). See also Jerry 
Gleeson, Father-Son Legal Team Turns Tragedies into Triumphs, JOURNAL NEWS, Feb. 17, 2002 
(noting that Rreindler & Kreindler, the leading aviation liability law firm typically gets 
contingency fees below 25 percent "because the number of victims in airline disasters tends to run 
higher"). 
146 See Bruee L. Hay, Contingent Fees And Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 525-27 
(1996) [hereinafter Hay, Agency Costs] (stating that average contingency fees in aviation 
accidents are 17 percent as "[ajviation cases involve high potential damages, liability (and the 
extent of the plaintiffs' injury) is generally clear and frequently uncontested, and few defendants 
are involved in the ligitation"). See also Kay, supra note 139, at A1 (reporting that "according to 
published reports" most plaintiff lawyers representing victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on New York City take contingency fees of 10 to 20 percent); Tim O'Brien, Cracks in the 
Plaintiff Bar s Solidarity: Sept 11 Survivors Caught Between Competing Brands of Legal Advice, 
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 1, 2002 ("The going rate [for lawyers representing September 
11 claimants] is a contingency fee of 10 percent to 15 percent "). 
147 Xhis information was provided by a leading airline crash litigator in a private conversation 
at a conference on eontingent fees. These percentages generate effective homly rates that I 
estimate to amount to $5,000-$10,000. See also Ed Bean, Damage Control: After 137 People 
Died In Its Texas Jet Crash, Delta Helped Families: Fut When Some Then Sued, It Investigated 
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firms charge rates ranging from 15 to 25 percent depending on 
particular circumstances of each crash and the number of clients they 
represent in that matter.'48 
The competitive pricing structure that has evolved in aviation 
accidents is a consequence of two phenomena unique to these claims, 
competitive bidding by lawyers and a settlement letter sent to victims 
families by the major airline insurer (the "Tenerife Letter.") 
When there is a commercial aviation accident, the names of the 
victims of the crash are made available by the airlines shortly thereafter 
and are often published in the press.'^^ Immediately after a crash some 
lawyers or their representatives show up at the location which the airline 
has made available as an assembly point for grieving family members, 
to offer their condolences and solicit clients.'^o others simply telephone 
the victims' families several days later to do the same.'5' This 
competition for extremely lucrative cases generates bidding wars in 
which lawyers undercut the prices quoted by competitors.'^2 
the Dead; A Life Reduced to Dollars; Scott Ageloff, Homosexual, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, '986, at 
lA (quoting Robert Alpert that fees in aviation crash cases "can work out to $10,000 per hour ). 
When the claims are solicited by lawyers who will be selling the claims to the dominant firms, the 
former tack on a percentage to the prices set by the dominant firms that will be their part of the 
fee. 
148 See supra note 145. While I have been able to determine that law firms credit efficiencies 
of scale by decreasing contingent fees when they obtain additional clients in the same crash, 1 
have not been able to determine whether these same firms go back to clients they previously 
entered into retainer agreements with and offer them the lower contingency fee rates they charge 
subsequently. The intensely secretive nature of the fee setting process impedes obtaining such 
information. By contrast, tort lawyers in other areas of practice almost never share efficiencies of 
scale with claimants. See, e.g., supra note 50 (noting the account of the aftermath of t e 
imderground steam pipe explosion in the Gramercy Park area of New York City). 
149 See Kaklik, et al.. Aviation Accident Litigation, supra note 140, at 56 (names of victims 
published in the newspaper). , . , . 
150 See, e.g., Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at 136. It is yet unclear what the 
impact of the 1996 Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act will have on this phenomenon. The 
Act comprises numerous provisions designed to protect and assist victims and their families in the 
aftermath of aviation accidents inside the United States. Among the provisions is a prohibition ot 
unsolicited communication by lawyers, their agents or potential parties to related litigation: 
Unsolicited communications—In the event of an accident involving an air carrier 
providing interstate or foreign air transportation and in the event of an accident 
involving a foreign air carrier that occurs within the United States, no unsolicited 
communication conceming a potential action for personal injury or wrongful death 
may be made by an attorney (including any associate, agent, employee, or other 
representative of an attomey) or any potential party to the litigation to an individual 
injured in the accident, or to a relative of an individual involved in the accident, before 
the 45th day following the date of the accident. 
49 U S C § 1136(g)(2) (2003). Giving teeth to the above provision is an enforcement mechanism 
allowing civil actions for its violation by either the National Transportation Safety Board or the 
Attomey General. 5ee 49 U.S.C. § 1151 (2003). 
151 See, e.g., Eric S. Roth, Confronting Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims,! GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS, 967, 971-72 (1989) (citing complaints of victims' families of solicitation ranging from 
twenty to over fifty unknown attomey contacts per victim). 
152 See Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Law: Solicitation, N.Y.L.J., Aug 5, 1985, at 1 
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Price competition has also been engendered by the use of the 
"Tenerife Letter" which was first sent in 1977 to victims' families, 
expressing the airline's condolences, offering immediate tangible 
assistance to cope with the effects of the tragedy,^53 and stating: 
You may find yourself under pressure to sign a eontingent fee 
retainer with an attomey whereby his fee is a pereentage of the final 
award. The rationale for such a percentage fee is that the lawyer 
risks getting no fee if there is no recovery. There is no such 
contingency in this case. There is nothing to be gained by a 
precipitous lawsuit. We do suggest that it would be in your best 
interest to evaluate the offers which will be made to you and obtain 
the help of your attomey based upon a fee for the work involved 
rather than a percentage fee of the award. 
Immediate legal action is unnecessary to avoid permitting 
applicable time periods (i.e., statutes of limitations, etc.) to expire. 
Should discussions not ultimately result in an amicable resolution of 
any claims that might exist, we provide a reasonable extension of 
any applicable time limitation based upon the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case in order that you will have 
ample time to take any path you choose as to counsel you retain, the 
basis upon which he is paid or whether you wish to institute a 
lawsuit. Please do not be mshed into limiting your altematives or 
committing yourselves needlessly to an inordinate legal expense. 
While the ostensible purpose of the letter is to present an offer by 
the airline's insurer to settle the case directly with representatives of the 
victims and bypass lawyers, the sub rosa purpose is to lower settlements 
costs by inhibiting contingent fee attomeys from using their usual zero-
based accounting system to mulct clients by assigning a value of zero to 
the claim and thus applying the standard contingent fee to the entire 
amount of the recovery.'^s victims' representatives, having in hand, 
substantial offers of settlement, are likely to be extremely reluctant to 
pay contingent fees applicable to the entire recovery without reasonable 
("[SJolicitation in the mass-disaster context has the effect of bringing the fees down. Solicitation 
means competition and information. Even the best and most skilled lawyers must respond to 
competitive pressures if they want any cases."). I have been informed by a lawyer representing 
defendants in aviation crash cases that in a recent crash, a claimant received sixteen calls from 
plaintiff lawyers seeking him as a client. In addition to touting their wares, these plaintiff 
attomeys competed by offering price reductions. 
153 The Tenerife Letter was first sent by Robert L. Alpert, Senior Vice President and Director 
of Claims of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., as a result of the mnway collision 
between a KLM Boeing 747 and a Pan American Boeing 747 at Tenerife, in the Canary Islands 
on March 27, 1977. See Randal R. Craft, Jr., Factors Influencing Settlement of Personal Injury 
and Death Claims In Aircraft Accident Litigation, 46 J. AIR. L. & COMMERCE 845, 897-98 
(1981). 
154 The part of the Tenerife Letter reproduced above was sent to victims' families in the July 9, 
1982 Pan Am 727 jetliner crash at New Orleans Int'l Airport, and is excerpted in Randal R. Craft, 
Jr., The Letter Should Be Sent, THE BRIEF, Nov. 1982 at 4, 7. 
155 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
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assurance that the increments in the recoveries to be secured by the 
lawyer will be sufficient to assure no net reduction in the clients' shares 
of the recoveries. If the lawyer advises a client to turn down the 
settlement offer and retain the lawyer to secure a higher recovery, then 
it is reasonable to anticipate that many clients in those circumstances 
will likely insist on limiting the contingent fee to the amount of value 
which the lawyer adds to the claim. 
The effects of the Tenerife Letter on contingent fee pricing were 
dramatic. From its first use in 1977 to about 1985, contingent fees in 
aviation accident cases dropped from about 35 percent to 15 to 20 
percent. The dean of aviation accident litigation, Lee S. Kriendler, 
while strongly opposing use of the letter, acknowledged some of its 
many benefits: 
In one respect-plaintiff lawyers fees-the . . . [Tenerife Letter] 
Approach has benefited the public. They have dropped from the 
33.33 percent that prevails generally in the handling of negligence 
cases to little more than half that. In the major airline cases, they 
currently average about 17.5 percent. 
Moreover, in some cases the plaintiff attorney's fee is based on 
the excess over what the defendant offers. In a situation where the 
claimant has been offered $800,000 he may be reluctant to retain a 
lawyer for litigation without something close to a guarantee that he 
will at least net $800,000. This has led to a variety of fee 
arrangements. 
The . . . [Tenerife Letter] Approach has also substantially reduced 
the fees of defense lawyers. The negotiation and settlement role is 
largely exercised by the central claims office of an insurer, which 
imposes tight control over the process.'^^ 
Plaintiff attorneys have been extremely critical of the use of the 
Tenerife Letter.Though it has not been found by a court or 
156 See KAKALIK ET AL., AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION, supra note 140, at 45 (some 
attorneys in aviation accident cases charge a contingent fee only on the portion of the recovery 
that exceeds the settlement offer that preceded representation). Victim's representatives are also 
inclined to exclude the in-hand settlement offer from the recovery to which a contingent fee is to 
apply because they tend to be more sophisticated than the average tort claimant. This reflects air 
traveler's higher socio-economic class than that of the general public. The reader who is familiar 
with the "early offer" proposal that I eo-authored, see generally LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., 
RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES, Manhattan Institute (1994) [hereinafter BRICKMAN ET AL., 
RETHINKING FEES], will recognize that the Alpert Letter is a form of the "early offer" proposal. 
Indeed, the Tenerife Letter was instrumental in the formulation of the "early offer" proposal. 
157 See supra notes 145-46. 
158 See Lee S. Kreindler, supra note 154, at 4, 38. 
159 See Andrew Blum, The Aviation Bar Splits Over Turf, NAT'L L.J., March 1989, at 1, 29 
("Plaintiffs' attomeys often criticize the... [use of the] Alpert Letter."); Bean, supra note 147 
(quoting Robert Alpert on the aftermath of the New Orleans crash: "A lot of lawyers became 
critical of us for contacting people [in New Orleans]. They said we were trying to take advantage 
of people. They were concemed we were settling too many and they weren't getting their fees."); 
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disciplinary agency to violate ethical rules, the depth of opposition has 
led to its discontinuance by the aviation insurance industry. 
Despite its discontinuance, the effects it has had on fees has 
persisted. Lawyers continue to actively compete for aviation crash 
clients and by so doing, engender price competition which has driven 
the average contingent fee to well below the level that prevails in all 
other tort litigation. The obvious question, of course, is why this 
phenomenon is limited to a tiny sliver, in terms of number of clients, of 
the tort claiming market. In the next section, 1 attempt to answer this 
question as well as consider why other mechanisms that would lead to 
price eompetition have failed to gain purchase in the tort claiming 
market. 
VI. IMPEDIMENTS IMPOSED BY THE BAR TO THE ADOPTION OF 
ALTERNATIVE PRICE COMPETITIVE MECHANISMS 
The simple answer to why competitive pricing that has developed 
in aviation accident litigation has not also developed in other tort-
claiming services is that eompeting for clients by such direct 
communication constitutes solicitation and is unethical, To be sure, 
it is unethical for lawyers to contaet the families of aviation accident 
vietims to solicit employment by offering to cut fees. It is nonetheless 
commonly done.'®i Attempts to curb such solicitation are periodically 
undertaken by bar associations which resent out-of-state lawyers 
coming to the scene of aviation aecidents and competing against in-state 
lawyers.Moreover, as noted, federal legislation has been enacted to 
curb the aetivity.'^^ Still the lure of effective hourly rates running into 
the thousands and tens of thousands of dollars an hour often in instances 
where liability is not contested is a powerful inducement. 
Anti-solicitation rules, though ineffective to preclude price 
competition in the ultra-small aviation accident market which averages 
200 or so claims annually, are apparently more efficacious in curbing 
price competition in the tort-claiming market where claiming levels 
average 1,000,000 annually.rules are one of a number of anti-
Craft, supra note 153, at 899 (I98I) ("A number of aviation plaintiffs' attomeys feel strongly that 
[the Alpert]... letter is improper.... No court or bar association has censured the letter or 
directed that it not be sent."). 
160 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.7.3 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
See supra noie \A9-5l. 
See generally Bumele V. Powell, The Problem of the Parachuting Practitioner, 1992 U. 
III. L. REV. 105. 
See supra noit 150. 
See Brickman, Disciplinary System, supra note 26, at n.45. To be sure, direct solicitation 
of claimants is widespread in tort litigation. Nowhere has such solicitation been more widely 
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competitive policies instituted by the bar to preclude price competition. 
These policies are intended to prevent the rise of market mechanisms 
that would otherwise arise to challenge uniform pricing. 
To be sure, all occupational groups seek to institute policies 
designed to limit price competition. For example, all seek to limit the 
supply of their services to drive up priees and seek to justify this and 
other anti-competitive strategies by invocation of the "public 
interest."'®^ So too with lawyers. Over 150 years ago, lawyers fought 
practiced than in asbestos litigation. Here, upwards of 1,000,000 or more present and former 
industrial and construction workers have been directly solicited by screening enterprises 
sponsored and paid for by lawyers. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 7, 
at V.A. Though this is one of the most massive recruitment efforts of any kind undertaken in this 
country and though the agents hired by the lawyers to solicit claimants receive substantial 
payments from the lawyers, anti-solicitation rules have not been applied to lawyers engaged in 
these activities. See id. at n.l07. However, though lawyers engaged in these client recruitment 
efforts are obviously competing for business, they are not competing with each other on the basis 
of price. If someone recruited to attend an asbestos screening sponsored by Attomey X indicates 
at the screening that he has already signed up with Attomey Y, he is informed that he is not 
eligible for the free screening. Id. at text accompanying n.l21. Indeed, I am imaware of any 
instance where one lawyer offered to represent an asbestos claimant for less than what another 
lawyer had agreed to charge the claimant. Indeed, even though tens of thousands of asbestos 
claims have been paid and are being paid through administrative processes, and have required as 
little as 10-15 minutes of paralegal time to process, many lawyers charge fees of 40 percent. See 
id. at n.89. 
165 For many years, the American Medical Association ("AMA") maintained that "it was 
unethical for physicians to join partnerships or other professional relationships with non-
physicians unless ownership remained solely in the hands of the licensed physicians." American 
Antitrast Institute, Converging Professional Services: Lawyers Against the Multidisciplinary Tide 
(Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://www.antitmstinstitute.org/books/multidisc.cfm. The 
justification for these restrictions, according to the AMA, was to preserve the independent 
decision making power of doctors and maintain high standards of medical care. Id. When this 
mle came under attack in 1975, a federal court of appeals rejected the AMA's justification and 
found that the restrictions '"had the purpose and effect of restraining competition by [non-
physicians], and restricted physicians from developing business stmctures of their own choice.'" 
American Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 449 (2d Cir. 1980), ajf d by an equally divided 
court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The FTC has also successfully challenged the optometry 
profession's ethics regulations barring its members from establishing offices in commercial 
locations (shopping centers) and from "engaging in the 'corporate practice' of optometry." 
Michigan Optometric Ass'n, 106 F.T.C. 342 (1985); American Academy of Optometry, Inc., 108 
F.T.C. 25 (1986). 
Anticompetitive regulations under the guise of justified professional stmcturing are not 
limited to the health care industry. Before the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to the 
restriction, the National Society of Professional Engineers maintained an ethics mle "barring 
members from engaging in competitive bidding." National Society of Prof. Engineers v. U.S., 
435 U.S. 679, 694-96 (1978). The association claimed that allowing competitive bidding would 
promote cost cutting measures and thus potentially endanger public safety. Id. 
The legal profession has also been formed to be subject to antitmst laws. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that the support and publicity 
provided by a lawyers' association for a group of attorneys who planned to boycott future 
representation of indigent criminal defendants if the government would not pass legislation 
providing for an increase in their fees as sufficient to "warrant condemnation under the antitmst 
laws"). The lawyers justified their actions by claiming that the quality of the representation 
would likely improve if the rates were increased. Id. at 423. The court felt, however, that this 
rationale was not a justification for tmlawful restraint of trade. Id. 
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to free themselves from legislative regulation of the prices they charged 
to which they were then subjected/^® and to opt instead for market 
based pricing. Once they achieved the right to freely negotiate prices 
with their clients, they then sought to insulate themselves from 
market forces by: restricting entry to the profession; banning 
competition from outside the profession; prohibiting the outright 
purchase of tort claims; and adopting ethical rules to preclude price 
competition, including rules prohibiting lawyers' providing financial 
assistance to tort clients and the brokerage of lawyers' services. 
A. Barriers to Entry 
The beginning point of any analysis of why the lack of price 
competition due to the rigidity of standard contingent fee pricing has not 
been counteracted by market solutions is lawyers' control over the 
market for tort claims.Tort claimants who wish to finance their 
pursuit by selling a percentage of their claim have a limited market. 
Nonlawyers are impermissible purchasers;'®^ the contingent fee system 
See Lester Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer 
Agreements In Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REV. 1037, 1046-50 
(1992) (deseribing lawyers' successful attempts to evade and then repeal, legislative "fee bills" 
which closely regulated their fees). 
167 See Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cimningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: 
Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory And Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 170-76 
(1988) (discussing the adoption of 1848 N.Y. Laws § 258 and subsequent legislative history as § 
474 of the New York Judicial Code, providing for the repeal of all "fee bills" regulating lawyers' 
fees and providing instead that "the measure of... [a lawyer's] compensation shall be left to the 
agreement, express or implied, of the parties"). 
168 Lawyers' control over the market for tort claims is part of the broader monopolistic control 
exercised over the practice of law. See, e.g., Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We Regulate 
Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 483 (2001); Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581 (1999). 
Technically, it is not lawyers qua lawyers who regulate the market for tort claims; rather, it is 
state supreme courts which have abrogated to themselves exclusive control over the practice of 
law. See supra note 126. This control is often exercised by the courts to further the interests of 
lawyers at societal expense. For a discussion of some of the "special rules" for lawyers that have 
emanated from this control, see Brickman, Assault on Fiduciary Protection, supra note 25, at 
sections VI-VIII. For purposes of this article, I use the term "lawyers' control" and "bar control" 
interchangeably to refer, inter alia, to control over the practice of law exercised by courts, bar 
associations, disciplinary boards and lawyers through collusive actions to maintain tmiform 
pricing. 
169 See Scales, Market For Tort Claims, supra note 1, at 897 (stating personal injury litigation 
constitutes "a very odd market—one with only a single buyer... [and] usually only one seller"). 
Many states, by rule or statute, prohibit the sale (assignment) of tort claims, or categorize such 
sales as champertous and therefore illegal. See MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R.L8, cmt. 6 
(explaining that the provisions of the Model Rules that prohibit lawyers from acquiring a 
proprietary interest in a subject of a pending litigation "has its basis in common law champerty 
and maintenance"); see also Michael Reese, The Use of Legal Malpractice Claims as Security 
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Under the UCC Revised Article 9, 20 REV. LITIG. 529, 534-35 (2001) (indicating that the UCC's 
prohibition of assigning security interests in a personal injury claim is a remnant of common law 
rules against maintenance and champerty). Since lawyers are able to, in effect, purchase a one 
third (or more) share of tort claims via a contingent fee arrangement, only lawyers are permissible 
purchasers of tort claims. See, e.g.. Title 17-A, § 516 of Maine's Criminal Code, which reads in 
relevant part: 
1. A person is guilty of champerty if, with the intent to collect by a civil action a claim, 
account, note or other demand due, or to become due to another person, he gives or 
promises anything of value to such person. 
2. This section does not apply to agreements between attomey and client to bring, 
prosecute or defend a civil action on a contingent fee basis .... 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516 (West 2002); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. Law § 13-101(1) 
(McKinney 2002) (prohibiting transfers of personal injury claims or certain real property); OKLA. 
STAT. tit.l2 § 2017(D) (2002) (prohibiting "the assignment of claims not arising out of contract"); 
Qi 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b) (2002) (authorizing certain assignments of claims against the United 
States government to be made only "after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, 
and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued," and further requiring a series of hurdles 
to make such assignment, including certification by an official). Contrast the prohibition on the 
sale of tort claims to nonlawyers with the free wheeling sale of claims by lawyers as illustrated in 
Cazares v. Saenz, 208 Cal. App. 3d 279, 282 n.2 (4th Dist. 1989). 
Rules prohibiting the sale of tort claims are a subset of common law mles against alienation 
of chooses in action. See, e.g., Karp v. Seizer, 132 Ariz. 599 (1982); J. B. AMES, THE 
INALIENABILITY OF CHOSES IN ACTION, IN LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 210 (1913); Walter 
W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1916); Jeffi'ey O'Connell 
& Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means 
of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 55 (1980). The persistence 
today of vestigial remnants of these prohibitions in the form of restrictions on the assignability of 
tort claims owes more to its utility as a means of precluding price competition in the tort claiming 
market than fidelity to tradition or policy. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. 
L. REV. 48, 66, 72, 78 (1935). 
In recent years, entrepreneurial ventures have begun providing financing to tort claimants in 
exchange for a share of the recovery. One such venture states: 
Injury Funds provides non-recourse financing and settlement advancement to Plaintiffs 
in pending personal injury lawsuits. In simpler terms, we purchase a small percentage 
of your lawsuits [sic] anticipated recovery. We do not lend money, we do not make 
loans, and we do not earn interest on our investment. Instead, if the case is won, we 
get a percentage of the total recovery. If the case is lost, the funds are yours to keep 
and you owe us nothing. 
Available at http://www.injuryfunds.com/about.shtm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). Another similar 
enterprise may be accessed at http://www.captron.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). Both 
enterprises and several others invest in tort claims by advancing nonrecourse loans (called 
"investments") to tort claimants who have hired lawyers to represent them in personal injury 
claims. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmidt, Staking Claims, WALL ST. J., Sep. 15, 2000, at A1 
(describing the Resolution Settlement Corporation which make non-recourse loans directly to 
plaintiffs and occasionally to their lawyers, based on the firm's assessment of the strength of the 
case); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts For Sale, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at 1 (Fisk 
explores the range of the now burgeoning business of investing in others' lawsuits and pointing 
out that it has now become common practice to invest in individuals' lawsuits. Investors have 
fiilly covered the market, beginning with wholly speculative claims that have yet to reach the 
settlement table, and continuing throughout the appeals process. A large portion of the business 
involves purchasing shares in previously awarded judgments that are on appeal.). Several state 
bar associations have issued ethics opinions allowing lawyers to provide clients with information 
about the availability of such nonrecourse loans providing that it is in the client's interest and the 
lawyer has no involvement in the process except for providing the firm with access to the client's 
file with the client's concurrence. See, e.g.. Professional Ethics of the Florida Bar, Op. 00-3 
(March 15, 2002); Arizona Ethics, Op. 91-22 (Sept., 30 1991); New York, Op. 666 (June 1994). 
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channels all tort claims sellers to one class of purchaser—the lawyer-
oligoponist. By insulating themselves from competition from 
nonlawyers for the purchase of tort claims,^''' lawyers fully capture, as 
one form of rent, the substantial finders' fees that lawyers pay to other 
lawyers, known as referral fees,^''^ that would otherwise be shared with 
nonlawyers or with clients who disintermediate and directly deal with 
the lawyer-litigator. By precluding competition in the purchase of tort 
claims, lawyers also facilitate minimization of price competition in the 
provision of legal services to tort claimants. 
B. The Prohibition Against The Outright Purchase of Tort Claims 
Most commentators agree that the most efficient fee structure— 
However, bar association ethics opinions restrict their purview to ethical issues and do not opine 
on matters of law. Ventures such as InjuryFunds and CapTran, by investing in causes of action 
and by providing living expenses to claimants so that litigation can be carried on are engaging 
both in champerty and maintenance. See GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODBS, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING 273 (2d ed. 1990). Many if not most states, however, have largely abandoned these 
common law proscriptions and whether or not these enterprises will be found by courts to violate 
statutory law or public policy remains to be seen. 
Another legal issue raised by these ventures is whether their fee structures violate laws 
against usury. The enterprises contend that though their nonrecourse loans are issued for 
effective interest rates that approach the "vigorish" rates charged by loan sharks, they are not 
usurious because of the non-recourse element, i.e., the risk of nonpayment in the event that there 
is no recovery. That is, they are investments, not loans. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and held that such an advance was a loan and therefore usurious. See Rancman v. 
Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St. 3d 121 (2003) (The plaintiff, Rancman, was 
advanced S7000 by the defendant. Interim Settlement, with repayment contingent upon successful 
resolution of her underlying auto accident claim. The terms of the loan called for an eventual 
return of $12,600 profit to the defendant. When Rancman settled her suit for $100,000, she 
refused to pay the amount due, instead returning the principal with 8 percent interest. The Ohio 
court held for Rancman, and denounced the practice of third party investment in speculative 
litigation. While the court did not disclose the reason for rejecting the argument that the advance 
was an investment, not a loan, it hinted that the reason was that there was little or no real risk 
being borne by the defendant). 
While these enterprises are experiencing substantial growth, other than the Ohio court ruling, 
there has been no major movement by the bar to ban them. This may be because these ventures 
constitute no threat to the bar's interests. Since the loans are only offered to claimants after they 
are represented by lawyers and, on occasion, to lawyers, they therefore do not induce any 
competitive behavior that threatens the bar's interest in precluding price competition; moreover, 
they do not adversely affect lawyers' shares of tort recoveries. For these reasons, these ventures 
are being at least tolerated by the bar. For a more detailed discussion of financial assistance to 
clients by entrepreneurs, see infra note 179. 
1^0 See Patrick T. Morgan, Note, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for Personal 
Injury and Wrongful Death Claims, 60 MO. L. REV. 683, 705 (2001) (restricting the partial sale of 
tort claims via contingent fee arrangements creates an uncompetitive marketplace for tort claims 
sellers). 
'71 For further discussion of the effect of referral fee practices on the issue of the competitive 
nature of the contingent fee financed tort claiming market, see supra text accompanying notes 92-
93. 
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one that competition among contingency fee lawyers would give rise 
to—is where attomeys vie with each other to buy the right to a client's 
legal claim and prosecute it on their own behalf.i^^ Such a structure, as 
well as other efficient fee structures that would promote competition, 
are prohibited; states do not allow lawyers to purchase tort claims 
outright or bid for clients^'^'^ By "restricting the [contingent] fee 
arrangement to a simple percentage of the award [, the bar] prevents the 
1^2 See, e.g.. Hay, Agency Costs, supra note 146, at 513 n.20 (1996); Santore & Viard, supra 
note 130, at 549; Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 522-23; Marc J. 
Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 331 (1987) 
[hereinafter Shnkartis, Market in Tort Claims\, Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Cnrrivan, 
Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 596-97 (1978). 
Another efficient fee structure to both reduce agency costs and cotuiter the ethically 
challenged zero-based contingent fee accounting system now in use, see supra notes 24 & 155, is 
for contingency fee lawyers to bid for clients by (1) identifying an amount of recovery (x) against 
which the lawyer will take a zero fee, and (2) the percentage of recovery that the lawyer will 
apply to an recovery in excess of x—which could be well in excess of 50 percent. The conceptual 
underpinning of this fee mechanism is set forth in Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 
94-99. It also underlies the "early offer" proposal that is referred to supra note 156. See also 
Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 522 ("[T]he optimal arrangement 
between lawyer and client from the perspective of reducing agency costs would be for 
contingency fee lawyers to "bid for clients, with the winning lawyer naming the highest x and 
receiving a standard percentage (such as 80 percent, for example) above x."}. 
A variant of this fee structure was used in In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 
F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), a class action suit brought against Sotheby's Holding, Inc. and 
Christie's Intemational PLC and their respective subsidiaries. U.S. District Court Judge Lewis 
Kaplan initially ordered that all law firms bidding to be selected as class counsel were to offer 
two figures: X and a higher figure Y. Under this proposal the class would receive 100% of the 
gross recovery up to and including X. The lead counsel would receive 100% of the gross 
recovery in excess of X up to and including Y. The lead counsel would also receive 1/4 of any 
recovery above Y with the remainder going to the class. Counsel would be selected "on the basis 
of both the economic terms of the bids and the qualifications of the bidder." Id. at 73. However, 
after "considering the comments of the amid and bidder," the court revised the fee structure, 
requiring bidders to offer only one figure, X, where the lead counsel would receive 25 percent of 
any recovery in excess of X. As in the first scenario, the court would weigh the economic terms 
of the bid and the bidders' qualifications. Id. at 74. The winning bid of $405 million as X was 
sufficient to secure the seleetion of David Boies and Richard B. Drubel of Boies, Schiller & 
Flexner, LLP as lead counsel. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, No. 00 Civ. 
0648(LAK) 2001 WL 170792 at '•'1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001). A settlement award of $512 
million thus yielded lead counsel a fee of $26.75 million, 1/4 of the recovery greater than $405 
million, or 5.2 percent of the recovery. See 2002 WL 170792 at *19-20. It is interesting to note 
that if this process were applied to selecting counsel in other class actions and it yielded similar 
percentages of the recovery, then class action lawyers would lose himdreds of millions of dollars 
and even billions of dollars in fee income that they are now receiving. This may explain why the 
class action bar (which also includes the lawyers who defend against class actions) has attempted 
to scuttle the auction approach with a broadside attack. See Third Circuit Task Force Report on 
The Selection of Class Counsel, Jan. 2002. 
See MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R.1.8(J); Santore & Viard, supra note 130 at 551-
56; Shukaitis, Market in Tort Claims, supra note 172 at 329-30. Prohibitions against bidding for 
clients are typically in the form of ethical rules prohibiting providing financial assistance to 
clients, see infra notes 179-82, paying anything of value to anyone for recommending a lawyer, 
see MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R. 7.2(c) or operating for-profit lawyer referral services, 
see infra note 185. 
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type of price competition that would... eliminate [lawyers' rents]."!^^ 
Whatever the historical bases for these restrictions, they are maintained 
today to inhibit the competitive behavior that would otherwise be 
unleashed.'''^ 
C. The Use of Ethical Rules To Preclude Price Competition 
From the time the first code of ethics was adopted^'^'' to the 
adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1967 and 
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility in 1983, a central 
feature of the ethical regimes adopted by the bar has been restraint of 
price competition by lawyers. But for the intercessions of the United 
States Supreme Court, such essential elements of price competition as 
the absence of mandated minimum fees, advertising, and group legal 
services, would have remained ethically constrained.''^ Despite 
175 Hay, Agency Costs, supra note 146, at 513; see also Santore & Viard, supra note 130, at 
550. 
176 See WOLFRAM, supra note 126, at 507; Samuel R. Gross, fVe Could Pass a Law... What 
Might Happen If Contingent Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 325-28 (1998); Radin, 
supra note 169, at 66. 
177 The first lawyer's code of ethics was adopted in 1887 at Albany, New York. H. DRINKER, 
LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1953). In the same year, the Alabama bar also adopted a code. ALA. STATE 
BAR ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS (1887). The anticompetitive tone of these codes was set by David 
Hoffman, a leading American lecturer on law in the mid-nineteenth century. His Resolution 
XXVIII provided: "I shall regard as eminently dishonorable all underbidding of my professional 
brethren." 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836), reprinted in 
DRINKER, at 344. 
178 Provisions requiring adherence to minimum fee schedules or restricting advertising by 
lawyers—struck down by court—exemplify attempts by the bar to preclude price competition. 
See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that a rule prohibiting lawyers from 
advertising violates the First Amendment); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 
(1975) (ruling that minimum fee schedules violate antitrust laws); Kenneth L. Penegar, The 
Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J. 473, 477 (1992) 
(stating that the bar's traditional anti-competitive practices included minimum fee schedules and 
prohibitions on advertising); Deborah L. Rhode, Why The ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective 
on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 702 (1981) ("A principal force animating any 
occupation's efforts at self-regulation is a desire to minimize competition from both internal and 
outside sources."). See generally Gregory H. Bowers & Otis H. Stephens, Jr., Attorney 
Advertising and the First Amendment: The Development and Impact of Constitutional Standard, 
17 MEM. ST. U. L. Rev. 221 (1987) (discussing the constitutional protection afforded to attorney 
advertising before and after Bates). While the striking down of ethical rules prohibiting 
advertising has led to price competition among a segment of the bar charging hourly rates or fixed 
fees for certain routine services, it has not impacted contingent fee pricing. 
Other examples of the bar's anti-competitive practices include entry restrictions and market-
division strategies designed to limit competition within the profession. See Roger Cramton, 
Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 551-52 (1994). 
In addition, ethical provisions regulating group legal services, prohibiting the aiding of the 
unauthorized practice of law and fee splitting, also seek to preserve lawyers' monopolistic control 
over the dispensation of certain services and, as well, to maintain lawyers' primacy over other 
professional groups. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 104; Brickman, Money 
2003] CONTINGENT FEE TORT LITIGATION 119 
repeated instances of the Supreme Court's striking down anti­
competitive rules adopted by the bar, many restraints on competition, 
expressed in the form of ethical rules endure, in particular, restraints on 
financing tort claimants and on business practices and organizational 
structures that would facilitate price competition. 
1. Prohibitions Against Providing Financial Assistance to Clients 
One ethical rule that applies virtually exclusively to contingent fee 
financed tort claiming prohibits lawyers from providing financial 
assistance to clients, typically in the form of payments to clients to 
defray living costs while the litigation proceeds—even if repayment is 
not contingent on the outcome.jhg ostensible purpose of these 
Talks, supra note 23, at 253. For an analysis of ethical rules ostensibly protecting client 
confidentiality but which maximize lawyers' fees and promote fraud, see id. at 253-54. 
While the focus of this article is on the offensive use of ethical rules to preclude price 
competition in the contingency fee bar, defense lawyers also invoke such rules for anti­
competitive purposes. For example, insurance companies have been forcing defense lawyers' 
fees down by limiting legal defense costs through billing and litigation management guidelines. 
Defense lawyers have struck back at these fee-depressing actions by invoking various sections of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in an attempt to declare such guidelines as unethical. In 
at least one instance, a state supreme court has concurred. See In re Rules of Prof 1 Conduct and 
Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000). A number of bar 
associations have also opined in favor of defense lawyers' attempts to limit the ability of 
insurance companies to limit their fees. See Amy S. Moats, Note, A Bermuda Triangle in the 
Tripartite Relationship: Ethical Dilemmas Raised by Insurers' Billing and Litigation 
Management Guidelines, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 525 (2003). 
There are less obvious features of ethical codes that may be seen to advance self-interest. 
For example, mles of ethics stress the obligation of the practitioner to zealously protect and 
advocate clients' interests irrespective of the social costs imposed by these rules. See Robert A. 
Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 J. L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY l, 37, 38 (1994) (suggesting that the ethical rules stressing zealous advocacy coupled 
with mles of evidence advanced by lawyers "that provide a broader and more absolute lawyer-
client privilege than" exists in most countries," are imposed without "concern for legitimate 
interests of third parties and society at large"). 
Payments to clients to subsidize living expenses and payment of clients' litigation expenses 
are treated differently by the ethical codes; the former is referred to as "financial assistance" to 
clients and the latter as "advancing litigation costs." Ethical codes allowed lawyers to advance 
litigation costs such as filing fees, transcript costs and expert witness fees, provided the client 
remained liable for repayment of the advancement irrespective of the outcome of the claim. See 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-8, DR 5-103(3) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL 
CODE]. This was changed when the Model Rules were adopted in 1983 to allow the repayment to 
be contingent on success of the claim. See MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R.1.8 (e) (1983). 
This change simply mirrored what was already happening in practice despite the previous ethical 
provision. That is, when contingency fee lawyers advanced litigation costs and the litigation 
failed, in most cases, the lawyer did not seek to obtain reimbursement of these advancements as 
the ethics rales would appear to have mandated. 
Both ethical codes prohibit providing financial assistance to clients, that is, subsidizing 
clients' living costs prior to or during the course of litigation. See MODEL CODE DR 5-103 (B); 
MODEL RULES, R.1.8 (e). For a detailed analysis of the origins of the rales prohibiting financial 
assistance to clients and of the policies cited in support of the rale, see James E. Molitemo, Broad 
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prohibitions is to protect clients from being seduced by offers of 
subsidized living costs into selecting lawyers on the basis of such offers 
rather than for other more "appropriate" criteria.'s® The real reason is 
prohibition, Thin Rational: The Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in 
Litigation" Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223 (2003). For a sympathetic treatment of 
advancement of living expenses, see Jack P. Sahl, The Cost of Humanitarian Assistance: Ethical 
Rules and the First Amendment, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 795 (2003). Nine jurisdictions depart from 
the general rule and allow latvyers to provide financial assistance to clients. Most, however, 
carefully circumscribe their rules to prevent advances for living costs from becoming a basis for 
lawyers' bidding against eaeh other to acquire clients by upping the amoimts of the loans being 
offered. This is done by limiting advancements to only those who have already become clients 
and by other provisions designed to preclude price competition. The most liberal provision is the 
one in Texas which allows a lawyer to advance "reasonably necessary medical and living 
expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter...." TEX. 
GOV'T CODE ANN. tit 2, subtit. G. app. A, art. 10, § 9, rule 1.8 (d) (Vemon 1998). The Texas rule 
does not, on its face, preclude using promises to advance living expenses as a way of competing 
for clients. However, no Texas court or administrative tribunal has ever interpreted the rule to so 
authorize. Seven additional Jurisdictions expressly authorize financial assistance, but, in efforts 
to avoid bidding wars, have carefully circumscribed the rules to ensure that "no promise or 
assurance of financial assistance [be] made to the client... prior to the employment of the 
lawyer." See ALA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT L8(e)(3) (2002); RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT OF 
THE STATE BAR OF CAL. 4-210(A)(2) (2000); see also D.C. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8 cmt. 
(2002) (where, in official comment, the Court of Appeals cautioned that the "provision does not 
permit lawyers to 'bid' for clients by offering financial payments beyond those minimum 
payments necessary to sustain the client," and that loans be made only "after employment"); 
MINNESOTA RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8 (e)(3) (1999); Miss. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
1.8(e)(2) (2002); MONT. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT L8(e)(3) (1999); N.D. RULE OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT 1.8(e)(3) (2000);WOLFRAM, supra note 126, at 509 n.89 (stating that California courts 
have interpreted the rule as forbidding attorneys to discuss the availability of loans before 
representation begins). 
One state, Louisiana, authorizes financial assistance to clients in a limited capacity, despite 
its code language prohibiting the practice. See LA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(e) (2002). The 
Louisiana Supreme Court allows attorneys to loan reasonably necessary living expenses to clients 
only if "the advances were not promised as an inducement to obtain professional employment, 
nor made until after the employment relationship was commenced ... and the attorney did not 
encourage public knowledge of this practice as an inducement to secure representation of others." 
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 446 (La. 1976); See also Chittenden v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Company, 788 So.2d 1140 (La. 2001). The Court noted that 
"[njotwithstanding the wording of Rule L8(e), the current practice of law in our State follows the 
Edwins policy of allowing an attorney to advance funds under the constraints enunciated in 
Edwins," yet cautioning the bar "on the need for scrupulous adherence to the RPC so as to avoid 
ethical problems which may appear almost unnoticed in their practice." Id. at 1146 (emphasis 
added), 1152. Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court, in allowing an attorney to make a small loan 
to a destitute client, warned, "[0]f course, the loan should not be the consideration for the 
employment." See In re Sizer, 267 S.W. 922, 928 (Mo. 1924); see also In re Berlant, 328 A.2d 
471, 479 (Pa. 1974) (Manderino, J., concurring and dissenting) (discipline of an attorney who 
advanced living expenses was appropriate because the advance was designed to influence the 
client to retain the attorney). 
'^0 See Attorney Grievance Committee v. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (Md. 1989) ("An 
important public policy interest is to avoid unfair competition among lawyers on the basis of their 
expenditures to clients. Clients should not be influenced to seek representation based on the ease 
with which monies can be obtained "); In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (Ariz. 1979) ("[T]he 
practice of making advances to clients, if publicized, would constitute an improper inducement 
for clients to employ an attorney. . .. [BJetween a lawyer who offers such an agreement and a 
lawyer who does not, the client will choose the lawyer who offers the lesser financial 
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otherwise. In the absence of such a prohibition, lawyers would be 
expected to bid against each other through offers of financial assistance, 
based upon the anticipated value of the claim.This would drive 
contingent fee rates down, effectively forcing lawyers to divide rents 
with their clients. Indeed, for many high value claims in which there is 
no meaningful risk, lawyers could be expected to offer to pay 
substantial sums, in some cases of low risk and high reward, as much as 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to claimants as signing bonuses.'^^ 
2. Prohibitions Against Brokerage of Lawyers' Services 
One business structure that we would expect to emerge if the 
contingent fee market were competitive is the legal practice equivalent 
of mortgage brokerage, a business structure which arose after the home 
mortgage market was deregulated. Mortgage brokers intermediate 
between borrowers and banks, offering to evaluate the borrower's 
financial circumstances, recommend and obtain the lowest bank 
mortgage loan rates available to the lender and further facilitate the 
lending process.Because of economies of scale, they are able to 
obligation ... 
1^1 See, e.g.. Attorney AAA v. The Mississippi Bar, 735 So.2d 294, 299 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1999) 
(restrictions against providing financial assistance to clients "are rationally related to the 
legitimate interest of the state in avoiding bidding wars"); Mississippi Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 
So. 2d. 1293, 1298 (Miss. 1996) ("[U]nregulated lending to clients [to provide financial 
assistance while a tort claim is being pursued] would generate unseemly bidding wars for 
cases...."); Kentucky Bar Association, Op. E-375 (1995) (reaffirming the state's ban on 
advances for living and medical expenses after noting that "dropping the time-honored rule will 
invite bidding by lawyers for clients"); see also Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 107 
n.317. 
182 See, e.g., Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn. 131-37 
(discussing the client recruitment efforts that took place after the 1989 Alton, Texas school bus 
tragedy and its legal aftermath. Anticipating effective hourly rates of $25,000 and more in a case 
where there was virtually no liability risk and little effort to be required, lawyers converged on 
Alton to sign up clients). Though it was both imethical and illegal to do so, lawyers "bid" for 
clients by offering various signing bonuses. See Paul Marcotte, Barratry Indictments: DA Claims 
Four Texas Lawyers Solicited Bus-Crash Clients, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 21 (stating that a client 
was offered $5000 cash and a new house by one attorney and a new GMC suburban van by 
another); Lisa Belkin, Where 21 Youths Died, Lawyers Wage a War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1990, 
at A1 (reporting the investigation of more than 15 lawyers for the possibility that they "gained 
cases by misleading or bribing families"). Lawyers did not, however, bid for clients on the basis 
of price. In this riskless, "sure thing" reward scenario, they charged contingency fees ranging 
from thirty to forty-five percent. See id. (reporting contingency fee rates as high as forty-five 
percent); James Pinkerton and Glen Golightly, The Spoils of Tragedy: Profiting on Disaster, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 2, 1992, at Al (reporting rates of thirty to forty percent). 
183 See Robert Buss, Use Caution in Picking a Mortgage Broker, CHI. TRIE., Nov. 13, 1998, at 
2G (stating that mortgage brokers act as middlemen during the real estate loan process, taking 
borrowers' applications, shopping them around to various lenders seeking the best loan terms, 
and finally collecting a commission for a successful matchmaking). For how mortgage brokers 
operate, see Edwin McDowell, A Booming Business in Selling Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, 
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obtain discounted mortgage rates from banks and other lenders which 
they pass on to borrowers, thereby underselling the very same banks 
and lenders.They derive income from fees paid directly by the 
borrowers but primarily from commissions paid by the lending banks. 
In a competitive contingency fee/personal injury market we would 
expect a similar structure to be replicated: the contingent fee-lawyer 
broker. 
The hypothetical "The Personal Injury People, Inc." ("PIP") is an 
example of such a structure. Seizing upon the public's recognition of 
the high degree of specialization in all forms of law practice, including 
contingent fee practice, and the public's paucity of knowledge about the 
quality of individual contingency fee lawyers, PIP would advertise that 
it evaluates personal injury tort claims and if it concludes that a claim 
has value, it refers the injured person to a competent lawyer who 
specializes in that type of claim, e.g., supermarket slip-and-fall, landlord 
liability, defective automobiles, toxic exposures, medical malpractice, 
etc. PIP would claim that it has specialized knowledge not otherwise 
available to a claimant that enables PIP to refer the claimant to more 
highly competent attorneys than the claimant would likely be able to 
obtain through his own efforts. In this hypothetical model, PIP does 
not charge the claimant a fee for this triage service; instead, PIP collects 
a fee from the law firm to which the matter is referred in the form of a 
percentage of the fee that the referred law firm charged against any 
recovery. Since PlP's fee would likely be about one third of the 
referred lawyer's one third fee, i.e., one ninth of the recovery, PIP may 
further advertise that it will rebate a portion, e.g., one half of its one 
ninth referral fee, to the claimant if there is a successful outcome, thus 
undercutting the prices charged virtually all contingent fee clients. 
More ominously, if PlP's business model proved successful and it 
began to refer large numbers of claimants to lawyers, and its success led 
other contingent-fee-lawyer brokerages to be formed, PIP would likely 
seek to maintain its market share by bargaining with some of the law 
firms to give a volume discount in the form of a lowering of their 
standard contingency fee rates for PIP customers. If it succeeded in 
doing so, then PIP might further advertise that not only was it able to 
secure higher quality specialized personal injury representation than 
individuals could on their own but that PIP customers would be charged 
lower than standard contingency fee rates. PlP's business model would 
at § 11, 1; Jane Bryant Quinn, Mortgage Shopping Still Wise for Home Buyers, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 
17, 1990, at Bus. 9. The business of brokering borne mortgages arose in the aftermath of the 
deregulation of the home mortgage industry. See Brokers Look for the Best Deal, EVENING POST 
(Wellington, Australia) (predicting a rise in the number of mortgage brokers in Australia, as has 
occurred in the U.S., due, in large part, to the deregulation of the banking industry). 
184 5ee BARRON'S, June 27, 1988, at 81. 
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thus likely lead to price competition , and at least a fair amount of 
discounting by contingent fee lawyers from standard rates. 
To ward off such price competition that would be engendered by 
PIP, the bar has promulgated ethics rules essentially prohibiting for-
profit "lawyer referral services"—the term it uses to refer to the 
brokering of lawyers' services—and restricting not-for-profit lawyer 
referral services to those which pose no threat of price competition.'^^ 
185 The Model Code promulgated in 1963, the Model Rules promulgated in 1983, and the 
Model Rules as amended in August 2002 [hereinafter NEW RULES] have provisions regulating 
lawyer referral services and will be considered seriatim. 
DR 2-103(B) (1980) of the Model Code provides: 
A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to 
recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a 
recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may pay the 
usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-
103(D). 
Id. DR 2-103(D) (1980) provides in pertinent part: 
A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm 
may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate with, one of the 
following offices or organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his 
partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm. . .: (3) A 
lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association .... 
Id. 
Numerous advisory opinions of state and city bar associations purport to interpret these 
Model Code provisions which essentially prohibit for-profit lawyer referral services and restrict 
not-for-profit entities to those that do not pose a threat of facilitating price competition. See, e.g., 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1510 (1985) (participation in a 
for-profit lawyer referral service, even were there was no payment by participating lawyers, 
would be a violation of a literal application of the Model Code); Ala. Ethics, Op. RO-86-81 
(1986) (giving discounts from usual rates in exchange for participation in a lawyer referral service 
would be valuable consideration, and thus unethical); Idaho, Formal Op. No. 114 (1985) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from paying a fee to join a private attomey referral service not sanctioned 
nor sponsored by the state bar association); Iowa Ethics, Op. 89-42 (1990) (considering the 
propriety of a law firm joining a referral program where, in exchange for being placed on the 
referral list, the firm "would agree to provide a free one-half hour consultation and legal services 
thereafter at a 25 percent reduction of [its] regular fees." Although the firm would not be eharged 
any enrollment or processing fees to participate, the ethics committee opined that discounting its 
fee in exchange for participation would be a violation of D.R. 2-I03(B)); Me. Prof 1 Ethics 
Comm'n, Op. 87 (8/31/88) (opining that a lawyer referral service for personal injury claimants 
privately operated by lawyers which would either charge participating attomeys or split fees on 
referred matters, would violate Maine Bar Rule 3.9(f)(2) which essentially replicates DR 2-103 
(D)(3) prohibiting a lawyer from compensating another for recommending his services). But see 
Neb., Op. No. 87-2 (1987) (reduced fees in exchange for participation in a for-profit service does 
not constitute valuable consideration, and thus participation is not inherently imethical); Ohio 
Grievance, Disciplinary Op. 2002-1 (2002) (improper for a law firm to pay an aimual fee to a real 
estate agency and offer discotmted rates to clients referred to the firm by the agency in exchange 
for the agency's promoting the law firm as a service provider). 
In 1983, the Model Rules replaced the Model Code and the operative language dealing 
with lawyer referral services was changed. Rule 7.2(c) provides "[a] lawyer shall not give 
anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services except that a lawyer 
may... (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal serviee 
organization ...." Id. 
While the operative language broadens the arena of permitted not-for-profit lawyer referral 
services from those "operated, sponsored or approved by a bar association" to those "not-for-
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profit lawyer referral service[s] or legal service organization[s]," the net effect of the change is 
modest. Advisory opinions interpreting this language indicate a somewhat broader range of 
permissible not-for-profit lawyer referral services but none that would pose a threat of price 
competition. See, e.g.. Pa. Bar Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, 
Informal Op. No. 90-42 (1990) ($500 fee paid by referred lawyer to referral service excessive and 
a violation of Rule 7.2 (c) even though the service was not-for-profit); Wis., E-87-7 (1987) 
(lawyer may accept referrals from legal services organization so long as he pays no consideration 
for potential or actual receipt of clients through the service). For-profit lawyer referral services 
remain essentially prohibited unless the business model poses no threat of price competition. See, 
e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-1510 (as long as lawyers 
did not pay a fee, they could ethically participate in a for-profit corporate lawyer referral service 
where the corporation provided "a variety of 'professional-type services' to its subscribers for the 
price of a $75.00 membership card"); Pa. Bar Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics and Profl 
Responsibility, Informal Op. No. 90-49 (1990) (membership in a for-profit lawyer referral service 
is unethical under the plain language of Rule 7.2). 
Utah's formulation of Rule 7.2(c)(2) (2002) differs from the Model Rule by omitting the 
words "not-for-profit." Nevertheless, for-profit referral was still essentially prohibited in Utah 
State Bar Ethics, Advisory Op. No. 01-02 (2002), where the following question was presented: 
A Utah lawyer referral service charges a referral fee to participating lawyers. It also 
charges a referral fee to its customers who are referred to lawyers. In order to make its 
business more appealing to the general public and businesses, the referral service also 
asks each participating lawyer to discovmt by 10 percent the lawyer's usual fees to a 
referred client until the client is credited with an amount equal to the referral fee that 
the client paid to the referral service. Because not all participating lawyers agree to 
discount their legal fees, the referral service caimot guarantee to its customers that their 
referral fees will be reimbursed to them through the proposed payment arrangement. 
Id. The Committee assumed that the referral service in question was provided by non-lawyers, 
and allowed that lawyers may pay a fee to a lawyer referral service "so long as that fee is not 
calculated on a per-referral basis." Id. However, the Committee found that a 10 percent discoimt 
to the client is a direct payment, which "seems to serve as a pretext for avoidance of the 
prescriptions of Rule 7.2(c)" and is therefore unethical. Id. 
For-profit lawyer referral services have gained some approbation from ethics committees 
where the for-profit entity is a law firm which, as part of its practice of law, refers clients to other 
attomeys in exchange for a "referral fee," that is, a rebate of part of the fee collected by the 
referred attorney. The operative language in NEW RULES 1.5 provides in relevant part: 
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be 
made only if: 
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, each 
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 
(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will 
receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and 
(3) the total fee is reasonable. 
Id. Under rule 1.5, law firms can divide fees in referred cases provided the requirements of the 
Rule are met. For puiposes of determining the ethical validity of the PIP business model, the 
relevant ethics opinions are those focusing on whether law firms can create special purpose 
entities devoted entirely to referrals and whether law firms can be created which limit their 
activity solely to referrals. In this regard, see Conn., Ethical Op. 01-03 (1/22/01) (approving 
paying part of a fee by a referred attorney to a for-profit lawyer referral business established and 
operated by a law firm but as a separate entity). Only one advisory opinion condones the creation 
of a lawyer referral service whereby the law firm's sole business is to provide referrals. See 
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Op. 93-13 (1993), which addresses the question: 
Inquirer represents an attomey who is contemplating starting a for profit attomey 
referral business to assist members of the public in finding an attomey. A prospective 
client would not pay a fee to the referral service. The law firm which was retained 
would pay a referral fee to the referral service for any matters referred by the service to 
it. 
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Under the banner of ethies rules, the bar has declared the PIP model, 
R.I.P.186 
Id. The Committee found that so long as the business started was not something other than a 
professional corporation, Rule 1.5(e) would allow this fee splitting arrangement amongst lawyers. 
The American Bar Association has recently amended the Model Rules, including the rules 
regulating lawyer referral services. Rule 7.2, as amended, provides: 
(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the 
lawyer's services except that a lawyer may: 
. . .  (2 )  pay  t he  u sua l  cha rge s  o f  a  l e ga l  s e rv i ce  p l an  o r  a  no t - fo r -p ro f i t  o r  qua l i f i ed  
lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service 
that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority. .. . 
Id. Comment 6 to amended Rule 7.2 provides: 
A lawyer referral service ... is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a 
lawyer referral service. Such referral services are understood by laypersons to be 
consumer-oriented organizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with 
appropriate experience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other 
client protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance requirements. 
Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a not-for-
profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is one that 
is approved by an appropriate regulatory authority as affording adequate protections 
for prospective clients. 
Id. Thus, the amended language is more explicit than the previous version of the Rule in 
prohibiting for-profit lawyer referral service and would appear to be inconsistent with 
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n. Op. 93-13 (1993), which approved a for-profit lawyer referral service 
provided that it was operated solely by lawyers. A member of the "Ethics 2000" Commission, 
which drafted most of the amendments to the Model Rules but not Rule 7.2—the latter changes 
were drafted by the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility—explains that 
the amendment allowing referred lawyers to make payments to a service "'approved by an 
appropriate regulatory authority'" was meant to "conform the rule more closely to ABA policy 
favoring expanded consumer access to legal services, while at the same time protecting 
prospective clients" in the hope that, inter alia, "states will establish a regulatory mechanism that 
ensures unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience ...." See Margaret Colgate 
Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 
2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 472 (2002). But it will be easier for a for-profit lawyer 
referral services to pass through the head of a pin than for them to gain the approbation of the 
"appropriate regulatory authority" which presumably would be state supreme courts or their 
delegees. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility: Report to the 
House of Delegates, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics-72_75.doc (last visited Nov. 7, 
2002) (noting that actual payment by a referred lawyer to a nonlawyer professional is prohibited). 
Indeed, were state legislatures to set up regulatory authorities to "ensure unbiased referrals to 
lawyers". Love, supra, most state supreme courts would strike down such actions as infringing 
upon the exclusive authority of state supreme courts to regulate the practice of law. See Charles 
W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-II: The Modern 
Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 212-13 (2002). 
While ethical codes do not directly apply to non-lawyer entities such as for-profit lawyer 
referral services operated by lay persons or combinations of lay persons and lawyers, referring 
lawyers are prohibited from paying the entity a share of the fee obtained since that would violate 
Rule 7.2(c) and its replacement. Rule 7.2(b)(2), as well as the prohibition of fee-splitting with a 
nonlawyer as set forth in Rule 5.4. 
Finally, the act of determining whether a potential claim should be referred to lawyer A 
versus B would almost certainly be found to be the practice of law. Accordingly, a for-profit 
lawyer referral service that was not a law firm would almost certainly be found to be in violation 
of state laws prohibiting the imauthorized practice of law. For a discussion of the anticompetitive 
effect of such laws, see Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
665,726-29; Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.41 (1986). 
186 Requiescat In Pace (rest in peace) is a prayer for the repose of a dead person. 
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D. The Effects of These Impediments And Restriction 
Absent these structural impediments and ethical restrictions, which 
are means of "maintaining rents for members of the legal profession,"'^'' 
it is likely that price competition in the market for tort claiming services 
would arise, thereby improving client welfare. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence and analysis presented in this article supports the 
thesis that the market for tort claiming services is not price competitive. 
A variety of indicia of an uncompetitive market have been considered 
including uniform pricing unjustified by considerations of efficiency or 
reduction in agency costs, price inelasticity in the face of highly 
variable production costs and rewards, the level of increase over the 
past 40 years in the inflation adjusted effective hourly rate realized by 
tort lawyers and the historical derivation of the standard contingent fee. 
Factors which inhibit the emergence of a competitive market have 
been identified including asymmetrical information with regard to the 
value of tort claims and quality of lawyering services, daunting if not 
prohibitive search costs, and price cutting as signaling an inferior or 
shirking lawyer. In addition, impediments to price competition imposed 
by the bar have been considered, including barriers to entry, the 
prohibition of the outright purchase of tort claims, and the use of ethical 
Santore & Viard, supra note 130, at 570. 
188 Sgg ("absent . . . [such] ethical restrictions, competition removes the rents [t]hat 
constraints on competition create and client welfare is improved") One commentator has 
dismissed the relevance of this analysis to tort reform efforts which seek to coimteract the 
outcomes of lawyers' self-interested strategies, noting that while "the obvious implication of their 
work is that the rules prohibiting purchase of claims and financing of clients' living expenses 
should be repealed... [b]ecause critics of plaintiffs' attorneys want more regulation, not 
deregulation, Santore and Viard's article gives them little comfort." Silver, supra note 38, at 
2093. This critique is overstated. The "rules" that Santore and Viard implicitly criticize are those 
prohibiting both the full ptu"chase of tort claims and of providing plaintiffs with financial 
assistance for living expenses. As one of the "critics of plaintiffs' attorneys" referred to by 
Silver, 1 do indeed favor the repeal of these anti-competitive rules, contrary to Silver's broad 
sweeping proposition. However, it does not therefore follow that 1 am necessarily in favor of 
"more regulation" to ciue contingency fee abuses. 1 am quite content to enforce current 
regulations, for example, by adopting the "early offer" proposal referred to supra notes 36 and 
156, and also in Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1 at nn. 265-68, which "increase[s] 
rather than diminish[es] consumer rights,. . . require[s] lawyers to comply with ethics rules[s]. .. 
[and] alter[s]. . . perverse incentives that encourages lawsuits rather than settlements." See 
Michael J. Horowitz, The Road To Reform, NAT'L REV., Aug. 20, 2001, at 31. Indeed, the "early 
offer" proposal may be seen to emulate the structure that would occur if there were a competitive 
market for contingent fee financed tort claiming services. 
2003] CONTINGENT FEE TORT LITIGATION 127 
rules to prevent price competition including prohibitions against 
providing financial assistance to clients and brokerage of lawyers' 
services. 
Perhaps the most controversial argument I advance to explain the 
lack of price competition is that lawyers act collusively to maintain a 
uniform price,aided in that endeavor by a variety of other 
mechanisms listed above. This assertion is inferred from the fact of 
uniform pricing coupled with the lack of altemative viable explanations. 
A more solid basis for the assertion, such as empirical data, would be 
desirable but I have none to offer. 
The explanations I offer for why the market for tort claiming 
services is not price competitive have a more solid basis. Even here, 
however, my analysis does not suffice to explain why no competitive 
models have evolved. Most especially, why tort lawyers do not 
compete against each other on the basis of price by advertising that they 
will offer, in select (lucrative) cases, to charge a contingency fee of zero 
on any amount of recovery up to $X and a standard contingent fee on 
any amount of recovery above $X, where X is a variable representing 
each lawyer's view about the amount of recovery that is virtually 
certain.None of the structural impediments or ethical restrictions 1 
consider would appear to preclude advertising such a fee structure. 
Here, too, 1 have to fall back to the less-than-satisfying explanation of 
collusive behavior to account for the failure of such a fee-setting device 
from having been introduced into the market for tort claiming services. 
Whatever the explanation for the absence of competitive pricing in 
the tort claiming market, there is little reason to expect price 
competitive behavior to emerge in the immediately foreseeable future. 
The only way that the barriers that have been erected or which arise as 
part of the operation of the market may be overcome is by regulation of 
tort lawyers' behavior. 
In theory, the market for tort claiming services is already regulated. 
Contingent fees are subject to both ethical rules and fiducial principles 
which limit such fees to "reasonable" amounts.'^' In practice, however, 
the regulatory regimes have proven to be largely devoid of content' 
and serve mostly to displace more effective regulation from outside the 
bar. 
The regulatory change that should be first considered is one that 
would emulate the market bargain that would result if lawyers competed 
with each other on the basis of price—as they do in airline crash 
189 Sgg supra text accompanying nn.123-24. 
19" This is the method described supra note 173. 
191 notes 19-21. 
192 See supra note 26. 
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litigation. That is, a fee agreement in which lawyers would not apply 
the standard contingency fee to the value of a claim that existed prior to 
the lawyer adding value to the elaim; instead, the lawyer would apply a 
standard (or a variable) contingent fee only to the amount of any 
recovery added to the value of the claim as it existed before the lawyer's 
efforts augmented the claim value. 
For such a regulatory approach to be implemented, it would have 
to be self-effectuating, require no additional bureaucracy for its 
enforcement and impose no significant transactional costs. These 
attributes are achieved in the "early offer" proposal that others and I 
have advanced.'®'* The proposal would prohibit plaintiff lawyers in 
personal injury cases from charging standard contingency fees where 
alleged responsible parties made early settlement offers before the 
lawyer added any significant value to the claim. Instead, the lawyer 
would be restricted to charging an hourly rate fee for the effort required 
to notify the allegedly responsible party of the relevant details of the 
claim. If an early settlement offer were rejected and a subsequent 
settlement or judgment was obtained, the lawyer would apply a 
contingent percentage to the amount in excess of the early offer. 
While this proposal, intended for adoption by state legislatures as 
an anti-price gouging consumer protection statute and by state supreme 
courts as part of the ethical code regulating lawyers' behavior,'®^ would 
only address a small configuration of the problem identified, it would 
nonetheless constitute a significant step towards wresting control of the 
tort claiming market from those who impose limits on price competition 
and benefit from its absence. 
1®3 5ee section v. 
194 See BRICKMAN ET AL.. RETHINKING FEES, supra note 156; see also supra notes 36 & 156; 
see generally Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal For 
Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173 (1995). 
'9^ See Adam Liptak, In 13 States, A United Push to Limit Fees of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 2003, at AlO. 
